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Foreword 
This study is a slightly altered version of my Thesis in Master 
of Philosophy in Modern History at the University of 
Glasgow. The thesis was made possible by the Royal 
Norwegian Air Force Academy, as this institution believes in 
giving its staff the opportunity to enhance their knowledge. I 
would especially like to thank Dr. Nils Naastad, Lieutenant 
Colonel Bjorn Tore Sneisen and Colonel Rune Bjerkas for 
their personal contribution in formalising studies for 
Norwegian officers at the University of Glasgow. 
I would like to explain deep gratitude also to Professor 
Hew Strachan, now Chichele Professor of War at the 
University of Oxford, not only for being my supervisor 
throughout the project, but also for his dedication to the 
cooperation between the University of Glasgow and the Royal 
Norwegian Air Force Academy. It is a great honour of mine to 
have been given the opportunity to cooperate with one of the 
world's leading military historians. 
I am also grateful to my colleagues at the Department 
of Air Power and Technology at the Royal Norwegian Air 
Force Academy, for their help and support throughout this 
work. At our department the language and feedback is 
somewhat uninhibited. Lively discussions and honest feedback 
is hopefully a foundation for quality. I particularly want to 
mention Dr. Nils Naastad, Lecturer 0istein Espenes, Lecturer 
Karl Erik Haug, Lecturer Lars Fredrik Moe 0ksendal, and Dr. 
Major John Andreas Olsen. At the Academy, librarian Nina 
Beck Anderssen has, as always, been most helpful. 
When I told people about the topic of this study, I 
mainly got two questions, the first being how I came to write 
about this subject? The answer is quite simple; I developed an 
interest in the subject when I took part in a project concerned 
with naming the classrooms at the Academy. To my own 
surprise I discovered that several Norwegian officers had been 
thinking about and discussing air power as early as 1906. The 
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second question has been if there is enough material to write a 
whole thesis about this topic? The answer is YES. The 
selection of sources has, even with such a limited topic, been a 
time-consuming task. For anyone interested there is a lot more 
material to study. In these circumstances, it is also worth 
mentioning that we who live in what we like to see as the 
most enlightened period, so easily believe that past times 
thinking was not very advanced. After completing this study, I 
have begun wondering if it is not the other way around. 
As most scholars will know, the writing of a thesis and 
marital life do not always go hand in hand. I am still happily 
married to Oddrun. That is a product of her patience. Thank 
you. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
It was 19 April 1912.' In the officers' mess at the Royal 
Norwegian Navy's main base, Karljohansvern in the town of 
Horten, three navy officers read that day's newspapers. The 
senior ranking of them was Lieutenant Commander Carsten 
Tank-Nielsen, captain of Norway's first submarine Kobben. 
The boat's second-in-command, First Lieutenant Hans 
Fleischer Dons and the mate on board the supply vessel Tyr, 
First Lieutenant Jens Helge Sem-Jacobsen, were also present. 
The newspapers reported that a Swedish Lieutenant, Olle 
Dahlbeck, planned a new flight in Norway the coming 
summer. He planned to pass Karljohansvern, and rumour had 
it that he wanted to bombard the base with oranges, just as he 
had the old fortress of Kristiansten in the city of Trondheim 
the year before. 
By April 1912 no Norwegian had flown an aeroplane over 
Norwegian territory. There had been several display flights 
from 1910 onwards, mainly performed by Swedish pilots, 
such as the famous Baron von Cederstrom, who had flown 
several times over Norway's capital, Kristiania. 
The three navy officers discussed the gauntlet that Dahlbeck 
had thrown down to the Norwegian Navy. They could not 
tolerate that a Swedish pilot should be the first to flyover 
1 This story is based on Dons 1935; Henriksen 1994, pp. 13-17; Thoresen 
1986, pp. 14-22. 
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Karljohansvern, the Navy's pride. It was only seven years 
since the dissolution of the union with Sweden. They decided 
that the first to flyover Karljohansvern was to be a 
Norwegian. They established a committee, which they named 
after their submarine. The aim was to forestall Lieutenant 
Dahlbeck. They were in quite a hurry, as their goal was to get 
airborne by the end of May. 
The Kobben flight committee did not lack initiative. It was 
decided that Dons was to travel to Germany to acquire an 
aeroplane and try to get himself some training as a pilot. 
Tank-Nielsen was to head a fund-raising campaign that would 
pay for everything. Dons was therefore given immediate leave 
by Tank-Nielsen, and left for Germany the same evening. The 
fund-raising campaign went ahead splendidly. They needed 
about 30,000 Norwegian kroner (NOK),' and after appeals in 
several newspapers they quickly managed to get that amount. 
The King of Norway, Haakon VII, gave 3,000 NOK. 
In Germany Dons did not have that great a time. The 
weather was quite bad, resulting in a queue at the pilot 
training school. He flew, however, several times, and already 
on 24 April he sent a telegram to Tank-Nielsen that just read: 
"All my worries have gone to hell. Get the money.,,3 But the 
weather was still a major problem, and by late May Dons was 
not ready to take his pilot's exam. He decided to return 
without a pilot's certificate. Dons had bought a Rumpler 
Taube, a two-seat monoplane, and had it shipped to Horten. 
The aircraft arrived in late May. Kobben's second engineer, 
Kristian Jacobsen Snekkestad, had been in Germany on a 
crash course, and was responsible for assembling the aircraft. 
Dons arrived on 31 May. They decided to try to fly the next 
day from the Gannestad field, outside Horten. At the last 
minute they named the aeroplane Start. 
2 The exchange rate before the First World War was approximately 18 NOK 
to the pound. In the rest of the period the exchange rate fluctuated more. 
3 Quoted in Henriksen 1994, p. 14, author's translation. 
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In the early morning of 1 June 1912 Dons, without a pilot's 
certificate and with just a few solo trips, seated himself in 
Start. Some seamen held the aeroplane back, since it was not 
fitted with brakes, and one rotated the propeller so that the 
engine started. The next minute Start flew over 
Karljohansvern, crossed the Oslo Fjord, and landed after a 35-
minute flight at 0ra by the town of Fredrikstad. During the 
flight Dons had taken his first ever turn to the right. 
1~ * * 
Why begin a study on the Norwegian debate on air power 
doctrine and organisation - a theoretical theme - with this 
practical story of the first Norwegian flight? First, to stress the 
differences between the practice of flying and debates on air 
power, thus elaborating on the topic of this study. Secondly, 
to make a point about the available literature. These two 
aspects will be outlined in what follows. 
The story of the first Norwegian flight is a matter of pride, 
and has been told elsewhere. But, a theoretical approach is 
necessary in order to explain the development rather than 
describe it. This study will therefore focus on the air power 
debate that took place in Norway in the period from 1900 
until 1923. The emphasis will be less on the development of 
Norwegian military flight, but on the doctrinal and 
organisational underpinnings of that development. 
It will be argued that there was extensive development of 
doctrinal views on air power. The inspiration for this 
development came first from the continent, and later from 
Great Britain. The concept of air power met little resistance in 
the military and political establishments, although none of 
them was particularly enthusiastic. The problems of 
developing Norwegian air power surfaced, however, when the 
question of organisation had to be solved. When the 
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theoretical possibilities of new technology approached reality, 
opposition emerged. 
The starting point for this study is around 1900. Although 
some officers had considered the use of balloons for military 
purposes before that,' it was not until the turn of the century 
that some saw flight as having an influence upon military 
operations. The study ends in 1923, when the Defence 
Commission of 1920 submitted its report on military aviation 
in Norway. A short epilogue will be given to explain the fate 
of the Commission's recommendations. 
Two conceptions are central to this study: debate and 
doctrine. The term debate is understood as a more or less 
public discussion on a subject, created against the background 
of disagreement. A debate or discussion demands at least two 
active participants, but this was not always the case. Several of 
the articles used as sources did not get a direct reply, but 
nevertheless they were part of a larger debate. It follows from 
this that a debate has to be carried out in a public forum. This 
view informs the use of sources. The main ones have been 
public documents and journal articles. 
The term doctrine is commonly used in military 
establishments today. NATO defines it as: "Fundamental 
principles by which the military forces guide their actions in 
support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires 
judgement in application. ,,5 In Norwegian the English term 
has its direct counterpart in the term "doktrine". However, 
the term was not used in any of the sources of this study. But 
principles for the employment and use of air power were, of 
course, debated. Although nobody referred to these 
4 Amongst others, a First Lieutenant Bonnevie had held an address on 
"Balloons for Warfare" in 1869 in the Kristiania Military Society, see 
R"rholt 1925, p. 287. Captain S. Jenssen held two addresses on military 
ballooning in the Trondheim Military Society in 1899, see Holtermann and 
Haanres 1900, pp. 58-59. 
'NATO, AJP 1 (A), AlliedJoint Operations Doctrine, September 1997, 
Glossary-5. 
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discussions as a debate on doctrine, that is what we would call 
such discussions today. 
Very little is written on the subject of this study. Not much 
scholarly work has been done on Norwegian air power at all. 
As John H. Morrow observes in the introduction to his book 
on aviation before and during the First World War, most of 
the literature about aviation is written with such a passion for 
the concept of flight that the analytical perspective 
disappears.' David Edgerton writes that almost every detail 
about every aircraft the British have ever flown is covered in 
the literature.' Another aspect of military history in general is 
that most of it describes military development as a military 
concern per se, and often fails to take into account the 
cultural, social and political influences on that development 
(and vice versa). As Michael Paris argues, this has been a 
feature of British aviation history, and the same can be said 
about the case of Norway. S The literature is mainly of a 
narrative nature without any analytical perspective. A lot of 
the authors are by definition pro-flight. 
To make my point about the literature, the story about 
Dons and his aircraft Start has been told in several books and 
articles. One can find out almost everything about it; how the 
weather was; when the aeroplane was baptised etc. But hardly 
any of the authors makes a huge point out of why this flight 
came about. Dons and his fellow officers in the Norwegian 
Navy had no special interest in flying or in aeroplanes.' It was 
the relationship between the big brother Sweden and the little 
brother Norway that triggered the initiative of the Norwegian 
navy officers. They just wanted to beat the Swedes, who, as 
always for a Norwegian, were the best to beat. 
6 Morrow 1993, pp. xiv-xv. 
'Edgerton 1991, p. 122. 
"Paris 1992, p. 3. 
9 None of the officers involved in the procurement of Start was involved in 
military aviation at a later stage, with the temporary exception of Dons, 
who until 1913 flew Start, see Arveschoug 1962, pp. 160-161. 
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Some works have, however, been helpful to this thesis. Vera 
Henriksen has written the official history of the Army and 
Navy Air Arms for the period.1O It is basically descriptive, and 
does not give much attention to question of doctrine 
development. Henriksen focuses on the personalities, and 
although she shows quite clearly that the development of 
Norwegian aviation was a story of accidental development, 
she does not put this development into any broader picture. 
The same can be said about an earlier book by Fredrik 
Meyer.11 A particular debate in the period from 1912 until 
1944, when the Royal Norwegian Air Force were formed was 
whether the two air arms should join in an independent air 
force. Olav Riste has written a short article on this subject,12 
and Bj0rn Magne Smedsrud has submitted a thesis at the 
Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy." Both argue that the 
reason for not having an independent service was that the 
Navy opposed the idea. Fredrik Tiller's thesis on the 
procurement of British fighters during the Great War has been 
helpful, although he has looked little into the doctrinal 
background for the procurement." 
Rolf Hobson and Tom Kristiansen's volume three of the 
ongoing work on Norwegian Military History covers this 
period, although with little emphasis on aerial development." 
The book gives, however, a brilliant background of military 
development in the period. On Norwegian foreign politics, 
Roald Berg's volume on the history of Norwegian foreign 
policy has been helpful, although it contains litrle about 
military questions." On Norwegian culture in the period, 
Hans Fredrik Dahl's volume on the period from 1905 to 1940 
ID Henriksen 1994. 
" Meyer 1973. 
"Riste 1985. 
" Smedsrud 1998. 
" Tiller 1997. 
15 Hobson and Kristiansen 200l. 
"Berg 1995. 
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in the Norwegian history of ideas gives good insights into 
contemporary debate.!' 
To put the Norwegian debate into an international 
perspective, several books are available on German, French 
and British air power. John H. Morrow's book on military 
aviation from 1909 to 1921 gives a comparative overview.!' 
On Britain, Hugh Driver illuminates technological aspects 
before 1914, and shows why Britain was not the leading 
country in pre-war Europe.!' Malcolm Cooper gives the 
background for the creation of the RAF in a brilliant book on 
British air policy during the Great War." David Edgerton's 
essay is written as an anti-thesis to the general acceptance of 
Britain as backward in aeronautical development. Michael 
Paris' splendid book on the literature and theory of aerial 
warfare in Britain has been a great inspiration.2! On Germany, 
Peter Fritzsche's A Nation of Fliers shows how German 
nationalism and aviation became intertwined from 1908 
onwards.22 Robert Wohl's A Passion for Wings is an excellent 
more general cultural study on the development of air power, 
and has also inspired this thesis." Wohl puts aviation and 
modernity in a broad cultural and ideological context in the 
years before and during the Great War. The same can be said 
about Azar Gat's Fascist and Liberal Visions of War." 
The study is chronologically structured, and divided into six 
chapters. Chapter two provides a brief political and military 
background. Chapter three focuses on the period before the 
First World War, while chapter four concentrates on the 
period of the First World War. The fifth chapter investigates 
" Dahl2001. 
1~ Morrow 1993. 
19 Driver 1997. 
20 Cooper 1986. 
21 Paris 1992. 
" Fritzsche 1992. 
" Wohl 1994. 
,. Gat 1998. 
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the lessons learnt in Norway from that war. Chapter six 
contains the conclusion. 
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Chapter 2 
Background 
A debate on air power does not take place in a vacuum. Both 
international and national developments formed the 
Norwegian debate on air power. Some of the international 
developments within air power doctrine will be commented on 
througbout the study. This chapter will therefore give a 
national background against which the debate on air power 
took place. 
The first part of the chapter will give the political 
background. The newly independent Norway was not 
struggling for power on the international scene. As a small 
nation on the outskirts of Europe in a period of accelerating 
rearmament, the Norwegian authorities did their best to stay 
out of the way. 
To understand the debate on air power in Norway, it is 
important to have some knowledge about the military system. 
The Army and the Navy operated quite independently both in 
military and political terms. The second part of this chapter 
will give a brief overview of the system. 
Political background 
1814-1905 
Since 1814 Norway had been in a union with Sweden. 
Norway had an autonomous position in the union, and its 
own constitution, parliament, cabinet, army and navy, but no 
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foreign service. Parliament had control over all funding within 
the state. After a harsh dispute with the king, the 
parliamentary system was introduced in 1884. 
In 1895 Norway suffered a bitter defeat when the Swedes 
threatened war to discipline the Norwegian authorities on a 
question about who should control the foreign service. The 
Norwegians had to back down, partly because their armed 
forces were in no condition to fight the Swedes. This led to an 
increase in armaments in Norway over the next ten years, 
with the result that Norway entered the 1905 union crisis 
with both a relatively modern Army and Navy. The break up 
of the union, however, ended peacefully. 
Until 1914 
In the first years as an independent nation, Norway 
prospered. The development of hydro power led to the 
industrialisation of more parts of the country. This created a 
labour force that radicalised politics. The period showed little 
stability, since governments changed quite often between three 
major political patties, the Conservatives (Hoyre), the Liberals 
(Venstre) and the Liberal minority party (Frisinnede Venstre). 
The first years of Norwegian foreign policy have been 
characterised as: "neutralism, non-alignment and a strong 
taint of isolationism. ,,25 The first Norwegian minister of 
foreign affairs, Jmgen Lovland, worked for a treaty, by which 
the great powers of Europe would guarantee the integrity and 
neutrality of the country. Great Britain, Germany, France and 
Russia signed the so-called Integrity Treaty in November 
1907. Great Britain had been critical, because the Treaty 
could create problems for their freedom of action in the North 
Sea. The formal Treaty only contained a guarantee from the 
signatories that they would respect Norwegian integrity. On 
request, they would protect it. 
" Ri,te 1985, p. 129. 
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Great Britain was portrayed as the implicit guarantor for 
Norway. Norwegians expected that Great Britain, in its own 
interest, would see to it that Norway, with its long coast and 
harbours, was not occupied by another great power. Roald 
Berg argues that the Norwegian security system was based 
upon three pillars: 1. The military, 2. International law and 3. 
The implicit guarantee from Great Britain." 
The budgets of the armed forces declined after the 
immediate threat of war disappeared. A new plan for a 
modern and well-equipped army was, however, sanctioned by 
Parliament in 1909, but the budgets to follow it up did not 
materialise. From around 1911 the Liberals were forced to 
change their military policy, partly as a result of the 
strengthened anti-militarism of the Labour Party 
(Arbeiderpartiet). Labour was, however, still too weak to have 
a major influence in Parliament. Thus, in 1912 a new navy-
plan was sanctioned. It would have modernised the navy, but 
it was set back by the outbreak of the First World War, since 
ships being built in Great Britain for the Norwegian navy 
were not released. 
1914-1918 
Initially, Norway followed a line of strict formal neutrality 
during the war. Politically the period was characterised by 
stability, since the Liberals headed the government throughout 
the war. The Prime Minister from 1913 until 1920, Gunnar 
Knudsen, was not, however, interested in security or military 
questions but in social welfare. It was the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Niels Claus Ihlen, who was the important war 
politician. Political opposition was almost gagged, since the 
Liberals had the majority in Parliament from 1913 to 1918. 
Norway's neutrality created increasing problems as the war 
lengthened. From the autumn of 1916 Norway drifted 
towards the Allies and especially Great Britain. This has led 
"Berg 1995, pp. 48, 91. 
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Olav Riste to call Norway "The Neutral Ally"." Although 
most of the country's trade before the war had been with 
Great Britain, parts of the academic and cultural elite had 
close bonds with Germany. Norway was dependent upon 
import and its merchant fleet, the fourth largest in the world. 
The Entente saw this large fleet as a weapon in the war. The 
war brought Norway closer to Britain in almost all aspects of 
life. 
Defence budgets rose. The entire navy, several fortresses 
and parts of the army had been mobilised at the outbreak, 
and, as guarding neutrality was not an easy task, especially 
given the long coastline of the country, claims for higher 
spending were sanctioned by Parliament. A strong and 
somewhat non-political minister of defence, Lieutenant 
Colonel Christian Theodor Holtfodt, led the development of 
the armed forces in the period. 
After the War 
As the Great War ended, and the League of Nations rose out 
of the ashes, Norwegian politicians began fighting for and 
against participation. The League was used to question the 
need for armed forces. The Government set up a committee in 
1919 to look at all aspects of Norway's armed forces, 
including total disarmament. A possible Norwegian 
participation in the League also challenged Norway's long 
tradition of isolationism, as well as the question of neutrality. 
In 1920 the seven-year reign of the Liberals and Gunnar 
Knudsen ended, and in the next four years Norway had four 
different governments, since neither the Conservatives nor the 
Liberals could establish a government based on a solid 
parliamentary basis. The growing Labour Party was 
radicalised by the Russian revolution and the establishment of 
the Third Communist International of which, for some years, 
it was a member. 
"Ri'te 1965. 
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By 1921 the Norwegian economy was in major trouble, 
troubles that would last well into the 1930s. From 1920 to 
1935 Norwegian industry was in almost constant crisis. The 
leading economic theory was to save in harsh times, and hence 
the budgets of the armed forces kept on decreasing." 
The Defence Commission of 1920 published its views on 
Norwegian defence policy in several reports from 1921 
onwards. The majority of the Commission rejected 
disarmament, thus securing the basis of the armed forces. 
The Military" 
The formal head of both the Army and the Navy was the 
King. This arrangement was mostly formal. The political 
leader was the minister of defence, who was responsible to 
Parliament. Norway had formed a joint defence ministry as 
early as 1885, but this jointness did not amount to much. The 
only joint position in the ministry was that of the minister 
himself; all others were placed in either of the two 
departments for the Army and the Navy. Leading each of 
these departments were respectively the commanding general 
and the commanding admiral. 
The ministers of defence changed quite often in the period,· 
with the exception of the five-year period in office of 
Lieutenant Colonel Holtfodt (August 1914 until February 
1919). All of the men who held the position between 1900 
and 1923, with one exception, were officers." Some officers 
were also members of Parliament. 
In an attempt to establish joint leadership of the armed 
forces, Parliament created the Commission on Defence Issues 
in 1900. This Commission consisted of the Minister of 
Defence, the Commanding General, the Commanding 
Admiral, the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the 
"Bull 1978, pp. 38,256. 
29 This part is mainly based on Hobson and Kristiansen 2001. 
30 Only one of the Ministers of Defence was an officer of the Navy. 
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Admiral Staff. As RoIf Hobson and Tom Kristiansen have 
shown, the Commission did not function as planned, and had 
little practical value.31 
The most important part of each of the two services was 
respectively the general staff and the admiral staff. Although 
both were formally subordinated to the commanding officers, 
they had a somewhat independent position. There were great 
differences between the two staffs. The general staff had a 
stronger position within the army than its counterpart in the 
navy. The general staff was also the larger: in 190737 officers 
were employed, whilst only five in the admiral staff. There 
were ongoing disputes on competence between the staffs and 
their respective commanding officers. 
The army was also by far the larger of the two services. The 
structure of the army was clearly based on what it saw as the 
potential threat to Norway, which was an attack from the 
east, most probably from Sweden. The threat from Russia was 
never that seriously treated in Norwegian army circles. The 
army depended heavily upon conscription and reserve officers. 
Only a small part of the officer corps and some non-
commissioned officers held full peacetime positions. Until 
1909 the army was organised according to the plan of 1887, 
and consisted of five infantty brigades. The supporting arms, 
such as the cavalry, the artillery, and the engineers, were each 
led by an inspector general, and normally organised in 
independent units. They were to suppott the infantty brigades 
when necessary. With the new army plan of 1909 the army 
was organised in six combined brigades with organic support 
weapons. They were geographically spread throughout the 
country, the 6 Brigade being formed in Northern Norway." 
The positions of the inspectors general of each of the army's 
arms were, however, kept. 
" Hobson and Kristiansen 2001, pp. 28-29, 171. 
32 In 1916 the term brigade was changed to division. 
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The Norwegian Navy was faced with two questions. First, 
was the navy to be a fighting navy that was organised to 
attack an invading fleet or was it to guard the country's 
neutrality? Secondly, was the navy to support the army's 
threat evaluation of a possible attack from the east, or should 
it to prepare to shore up neutrality during a war in the North 
Sea between Germany and Great Britain? Until a new plan for 
the navy was approved by Parliament in 1912, the navy's 
structure was a compromise between these two scenarios. The 
new plan was very ambitious, partly as a result of the 
percieved threat to Norway during the Moroccan crisis of 
1911, when large parts of the German fleet trained off the 
Norwegian coast. The North Sea scenario was chosen as the 
most likely, but the navy's structure was still a compromise 
between a war-fighting organisation and an armed coast 
guard. The plan of 1912 was never carried out, due to both 
the outbreak of the First World War, which made the 
procurement of ships abroad difficult, and the lack of funding. 
The plan was important, though, in a doctrinal perspective, 
since it so clearly chose one scenario. 
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Chapter 3 
Air Power in Norway? 
Although air power was new technology which had the 
potential to change war fundamentally, the Norwegian air 
power debate in this period cannot be termed speculative at 
all. It has not been possible to find any literature of the kind 
that Michael Paris has written about." Moreover, there is no 
Norwegian parallel to the British science fiction writer H.G. 
Wells' book The War in the Air from 1908." 
Mostly officers participated in the debate. Probably this 
created a debate that never contained very speculative 
thoughts on future warfare. Air power was mainly seen as a 
new means for waging the wars of yesterday. 
In addition to this, most of the debate had a land and not a 
naval perspective, which enhanced this view of warfare. The 
aircraft had an inherent potential for observation, and this 
was therefore to be its purpose. The fighting would be done 
by men on the ground, not by machines in the air. As both 
Stile Ulriksen and Karsten Friis have pointed out, the mental 
picture of the citizen soldier with his rifle has been very strong 
in the Norwegian army." This picture of the Norwegian as a 
common man and hence a common soldier who would fight 
33 Paris 1992. 
34 Kare Fasting has pointed out, however, that Wells' book was published in 
Norwegian serials, but claims that most people did not take his book that 
seriously, see Fasting 1959, p. 36. 
"Ulriksen 2002; Friis 2000, pp. 119-143. 
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in the harsh parts of Norway, made it difficult to argue for 
one of the most important symbols of the machine age - the 
aircraft. 
This mental picture had its opposite in the belief in 
modernisation. The belief in a better society and future 
through science, technology and the enlightenment of the 
people was strong. The development in communications 
especially inspired people's fantasies. Some even claimed that 
when the new communications had torn down the imaginary 
walls surrounding mankind, they would bring peace and 
prosperity to mankind, and make war impossible. As Per 
Fuglum points out, the fascination for new technological 
achievements was huge, and the aircraft was among the new 
developments that created the largest sensations and bravest 
expectations." In the early summer months of 1914 a huge 
exhibition was held in Kristiania to celebrate the 100th 
anniversary of the Constitution. The exhibition glorified 
technology and the belief in the future." The famous 
Norwegian author, Bj0rnstjerne Bjmnson, expressed this 
belief when he received the Nobel Prize for literature in 1903: 
I see the development of mankind as an endless journey on a 
path forward - if not in a straight line, indeed forward. An 
irresistible desire drives it, from the beginning by instinct 
alone, but thereafter ever more consciollsly.38 
The tension between these two views had a clear impact on 
the air power debate. There were three officers whose 
engagement in air power made them propagandists of the new 
weapon, Einar Sem-Jacobsen and Severin Christian Holm 
Simonsen of the Army, and Halfdan Gyth Dehli of the navy. 
They all argued for the need to develop Norwegian air power, 
but were reluctant to use too speculative a vocabulary. These 
36 Fuglum 1978, pp. 133-168. 
" AIn"" 1999, p. 63. 
3S Quoted in Fuglum 1978, p. 136, author's translation. 
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three men and their ideas will be discussed more closely in 
what follows. Thereafter the reactions from the establishment 
will be examined, including the arguments for and against the 
development of air power, before the chapter will end with a 
discussion on organisation. 
The propagandists 
Air power was in this period seen first and foremost as an 
instrument of observation. In most of the articles no other use 
of airspace was commented on or foreseen. The foremost 
exponent of this view was Einar Olaf Sem-Jacobsen. 
Sem-Jacobsen was born in 1878, the son of a Lieutenant 
Colonel in the army. He became a student in 1896, graduated 
from the War Academy (Krigsskolen) in 1899, and the Staff 
College (Den Militrere H0iskole) in 1901. He was an engineer 
officer of the army, and became inspired by aeronautics quite 
early. He gave the first of his many lectures on air power at 
the Kristiania Military Society (Kristiania Militrere Samfund) 
in 1904, the most important rostrum for military speakers in 
Norway." In 1909 he talked about the man-lifting kites, 
which he was in the process of constructing for the polar 
explorer Roald Amundsen." In 1911 he lectured on the latest 
French military aircraft," and he spoke on 25 March 1912 
about the military use of aeroplanes.42 
Sem-Jacobsen wrote several articles on air power. The main 
body of them was factual, giving reports on developments in 
continental Europe. He also wrote articles on the technicalities 
of airships and aircraft, as well as articles advocating the 
development of Norwegian air power. 
39 "Aarsberetning for Kristiania Milita=:re Sarnfund 1904", Norsk Militf2rt 
Tidsskrift, 2/1905, p. 122. 
40 "Aarsberetning for Kristiania Milita:re Samfund 1909", Norsk Militcert 
Tidsskrift, 2/1910, p. 99. 
41 "Aarsberetning for Kristiania Militrere Samfund 1911", Norsk Militcert 
Tidsskrift, 2/1912, p. 203. 
"Sem-Jacobsen 1912, pp. 231-247. 
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In 1909 he wrote his first of many articles on air power." 
This article is a clear example of Sem-Jacobsen's ideas on air 
power before the Great War, and will therefore be used to 
illustrate his views. The article focused upon the military use 
of all the types of aerial vessels; captive balloons, free-
balloons, kites, airships and aircraft. He began the article with 
the negative outcome of the second Hague peace conference 
with regards to the ban on bombardment from the air, and 
used this as an argument to foresee military use of the air 
without limitations in a coming war. 44 He was of the opinion 
that balloons would mainly be used for signalling, 
reconnaissance and observation purposes. The captive balloon 
would be used as an observation platform for an army in the 
field and the free balloon for signalling from an entrenched 
army or city. But he concluded that the airship would take 
over the balloon's role as a platform for observing and 
signalling. 
Sem-Jacobsen also commented on the problems concerning 
the downing of captive balloons. This was not easy with 
ordinary artillery guns: one had to have weapons specially 
constructed for this purpose. To solve this problem, however, 
he had an original idea. He claimed that an airship could do 
the job quite easily, running into the captive balloons one by 
one. Sem-Jacobsen here foresaw the air-to-air battle, although 
only one of the battling parties would be able to manoeuvre. 
Sem-Jacobsen gave some attention to the offensive aspects 
of air power. He pointed out that thoughts on the offensive 
use of air power were strictly theoretical, since it had not yet 
been tried in war. He saw the aeroplane mainly as a means of 
observation or for the transportation of commanding officers, 
due to its limitation in tonnage. The airship would, however, 
" Sem-Jacobsen 1909, pp. 505-512. 
44 The second Hague conference was conducted between 15 June and 18 
October 1907. The attempts to ban bombardment from rhe air did not 
succeed. 
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be a terrible offensive weapon, spreading severe damage to the 
targets it would attack. Sem-Jacobsen had opinions on the 
targets too, although he did not argue for this selection. He 
did not see armies in the field as suitable targets. Airships 
would rather attack targets behind the front - the bases of the 
army. The targets would therefore be the enemy's seaports, his 
depots, his railway junctions and his fleet. In other words, 
Sem-Jacobsen was referring to what we today term 
interdiction, defined as operations "conducted to destroy, 
disrupt, neutralise or delay the enemy's military potential 
before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly 
forces. ,,45 
Sem-Jacobsen's view on the offensive potential of air power 
developed along with its technological development. Already 
in 1913 he suggested that there be three small units of 
offensive aircraft in the Norwegian air power inventory. The 
reasons for this suggestion were not given, however, and it is 
quite difficult to see what development Sem-Jacobsen's ideas 
had gone through to make him suggest this. One did not have 
to be that visionary to believe in air power's potential as an 
offensive weapon in 1913, but it was a great leap to put such 
a vision into practice by establishing three offensive units 
within such a small air arm. The Defence Ministry seems not 
to have taken the suggestion seriously, since it was no more 
than mentioned in their proposition to Parliament.46 
Sem-Jacobsen wrote about the moral aspect of air power 
several times. Although he seemed somewhat sceptical of air 
power's capacity to hit and destroy targets, he pointed out 
that offensive air power at least would have a great moral 
impact on the enemy. Troops attacked from the air - or 
troops who had only seen an aircraft - would be frightened, 
and thus do their job worse. The moral fibre within the armed 
forces of a country without aeroplanes, if the enemy had 
45 Royal Air Force, AP 3000. Air Power Doctrine, 2nd Edition, 1993. 
"Stortingsproposisjon 14711913, 15. 
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many, would break. Sem-Jacobsen foresaw that air power 
would not be a precise weapon, and used air power's long 
lasting but never conclusively proven argument - that bombs 
from the air would have a moral impact. 
Sem-Jacobsen made a point of explaining that air power 
would bring warfare to a new dimension and that this would 
mean that the traditional boundaries of warfare would 
become obsolete. The 1909 article concluded that "[wJith the 
airships of war the existing boundaries of military operations 
will vanish. ,," Although Sem-Jacobsen claimed this, his views 
on the development of air power cannot be categorised as very 
visionary. He was, however, amongst the few Norwegians 
who foresaw the development of aerial bombardment as early 
as 1909, but he had a practical focus and seemed not to be 
too interested in speculations about the future. It could be that 
this lack of vision about future developments stemmed from a 
wish not to emphasise air power's possible contribution to 
warfare. Too visionary ideas could lead to a lesser impact in 
the defence community. 
Sem-Jacobsen was most definitely the person writing on air 
power who reached the broadest audience. Although most of 
his articles were published in the Norwegian Military Journal 
and most of his speeches were probably given to military 
audiences. He wrote for other journals as well. When the 
Norwegian Aeronautical Association launched its journal, 
Aeronautics (Luftseilads), in 1910, Sem-Jacobsen was the 
most frequent contributor. The same year he also wrote a 
series of articles for Technology Weekly (Teknisk Ukeblad), a 
magazine that focused on technical development, and had a 
wide audience throughout the country." These richly 
illustrated articles are quite an impressive run-through of all 
the different types of airships. In addition to his writing, he 
addressed different audiences throughout the country. Sem-
47 Sem-Jacobsen 1909, p. 510, author's translation . 
.. Sem-Jacobsen 1910. 
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Jacobsen spoke at least twice to the Polytechnic Association, 
the foremost technological association in Norway." 
When H. Aschehoug published a six volume monumental 
encyclopaedia from 1907 to 1913, Sem-Jacobsen was the 
expert on aerial subjects.50 The historian Hans Fredrik Dahl 
has termed this a pioneering encyclopaedic work written by 
the foremost experts in all fields of knowledge in Norway." 
This suggests that Sem-Jacobsen was not only the foremost 
expert on these issues, but also known to be that. The 
government also used Sem-Jacobsen several times as an expert 
on air power. He also assumed this role with the Inspector 
General of the Engineering Arm on several occasions. As such, 
Sem-Jacobsen had a great influence on Norwegian aerial 
policy at several levels of government. Since the Defence 
Ministry was the body that was to evaluate the proposals 
from the different Inspectors General, Sem-Jacobsen had a 
dual role both as the one who proposed new ideas and as an 
evaluator of the ideas of others. 
Sem-Jacobsen became the central aerial pioneer in the 
Army. He flew in the first captive balloon at Fredriksten in 
1906, and took the initiative to form the Norwegian 
Aeronautical Association in May 1909, becoming its secretary 
and definitely most eager member for the next ten years." He 
qualified as a certified balloon pilot in 1910. With his own 
funding he was educated as an aeronautical engineer in Paris 
in 1911. He was one of four officers who got a scholarship 
from the government to become a pilot in 1912, obtaining the 
international flying certificate on 21 July 1912. He became the 
" 6 April 1909 he spoke on the development of flight in the Polytechnic 
Association. The address mainly dealt with the technological development, 
and is thus not that important to this study. Parts of the address is given in 
Fasting 1959, pp. 18-20. 
"Nyhus 1907-1913. 
" Dah12001, p. 138. 
52 The pioneer years of the Norsk Luftseiladsforening and Sem-Jacobsen key 
role within that organisation is described in Fasting 1959, pp. 1-200. 
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main developer of the Norwegian Army Air Arm from 1912 
onwards, and served as Chief of the Army Air Arm Technical 
Branch and the aircraft factory at Kjeller.53 
Sem-Jacobsen was a stubborn and short-tempered man. 
This was combined with loads of enthusiasm on air power 
matters and plenty of ideas about the development of 
Norwegian air power. Norwegian bureaucracy disappointed 
him on several occasions, and, as he protested quite loudly, 
his influence slowly waned. 54 
Sem-Jacobsen visited Germany for aeronautical purposes 
both in 1909 and 1910. In 1909 he flew as a passenger with 
Orville Wright and in 1911 he visited the aeronautical 
exhibition in Turin.55 Despite this, he seems to have been most 
interested in the development in France. The obvious reason 
for this was that France was the leading nation with regard to 
aircraft before 1914. Sem-Jacobsen visited France several 
times - in 1911 he attended the famous military aircraft 
competition in Reims." He also represented the Norwegian 
Aeronautical Association at the international conference 
arranged by Federation Aeronautique Internationale (FAI) in 
Paris in October 1910." It was respectively Parliament, which 
awarded Sem-Jacobsen a small scholarship to study air power, 
and the Norwegian Aeronautical Association that paid for 
these trips . 
.53 Sem-Jacobsen wrote about these innovative years in Sem-Jacobsen and 
Arnesen 1930. 
54 Amongst others, Sem-Jacobsen was very disappointed and wrote a lengthy 
letter threatening to leave the Army to the Defence Ministry when they 
nominated his fellow airman, Henrik Thaulow} as the first Chief of the 
Army Air Arm Tactical Branch on 15 August 1913. This happened in spite 
of the fact that Sem-Jacobsen from January 1913 temporarily had been 
appointed chief at the air base at KjeUer, which meant that Sem-Jacobsen 
led military flight in the Army. 
"Henriksen 1994, pp. 19-20. 
"Sem-Jacobsen 1912, pp. 37-65. 
"Engelstad 1910,24. 
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Sem-Jacobsen's impact on the ideas of air power in Norway 
was quite large. He was the central figure in the military and 
at the political level as an adviser, and he influenced public 
opinion through his works in the encyclopaedia and also in 
other popular writings. His sobering influence was probably 
one of the reasons why the Norwegian air power debate never 
took the speculative form it did in other countries. The 
historian Kire Fasting has indeed described Sem-Jacobsen as a 
"sober enthusiast"." Although he was extremely enthusiastic 
about the development of manned flight, he did not fantasise 
about it. 
The other army officer who wrote extensively on air power 
in this period was Severin Christian Holm Simonsen. He spent 
his entire military career in the Fortress Artillery Arm. Like 
the Engineering Arm, this was not an arm that led to high-
ranking commands." He became an officer in 1901, and was 
thirty years old and a First Lieutenant when he began writing 
about air power issues in 1906. In 1907 he visited Germany, 
most probably on a study trip in an aeronautical context, and 
witnessed tests with different types of balloons." From 1906 
to 1910 Holm Simonsen wrote on air power and other 
technological issues of war. Three articles on air power were 
published in 1906-07 in the Norwegian Military Journal. He 
was the first to write on military aviation in Aeronautics 
(Luftseilads) in 1910." In addition, he wrote about other 
technological developments and how they would influence 
warfare." He also gave addresses on these matters. On 21 
December 1909 he conducted a discourse on military 
"Fasting 1959, p. 19. 
59 In 1917 none of Norway's 12 generals was a fortress artillerist. Ofthe 
colonels, only two out of thirty were from this arm, and amongst a total 
amount of 39 Lieutenant Colonels, only five were fortress artillerists. See 
Militterkalender for den norske HIEr og F1aate 1917 (Kristiania, 1917), pp. 
167-169. 
60 Holm Simonsen 1910, p. 15. 
" Ibid. 
"Holm Simonsen 1908; Holm Simonsen 1909. 
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aeronautics in the Norwegian Aeronautical Association. 63 
Near the end of 1910 or the beginning of 1911 he delivered 
another lecture at the Bergen Military Society where he again 
talked about the influence of air power on warfare. 64 
Holm Simonsen was probably the author of the first article 
written by a Norwegian to comment on the offensive potential 
of air power in 1906.65 He saw air power mainly as a platform 
for observation and reconnaissance. In this rather visionary 
article he was possibly the first to use the term air power, 66 
and he claimed that technological development would lead to 
air power becoming as influential as land and sea power. He 
focused on the use of the airship as an offensive weapon, and 
used experiments in France on bombardment from the air to 
underline this argument. Airships were able to carry 
explosives that could be thrown against targets on the ground, 
and they would therefore be used for such a purpose. Holm 
Simonsen argued that this was a temporary problem. The 
main point of the article was, however, that air power had 
come of age with the invention of the airship, especially as a 
means of observation. 
In 1909 Holm Simonsen wrote a lengthy article which was 
published over four editions of the Norwegian Military 
Journal." The article dealt with the development of fortress 
guns and tried to evaluate which types of guns would be used 
in the future. Holm Simonsen named one section air power. 
He pointed out that aircraft could now be a possible target for 
the guns of a fortress. He also stressed that the future lay in 
the airship. Holm Simonsen again argued that the main use of 
airships would be for observation purposes, but referred to 
tests in both France and Germany to conclude that they would 
also be used for offensive purposes. He also mentioned the 
63 Engelstad, 1910, p. 4. 
64 "Bergens militrerforening", NOTSk Militcert Tidsskrift, 1211911, p. 746. 
"Holm Simonsen 1906, pp. 653-662. 
66 The Norwegian term is "luftmakt". 
67 Holm Simonsen 1909. 
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conclusion of major Gross, head of the Prussian airship 
battalion, that Germany must now develop its own anti-
aircraft artillery. Holm Simonsen concluded: "In other words, 
the modern air force engages itself not only in observation and 
reconnaissance missions, but also in the provision of 
weaponry that can be used from the airships.,,68 
Holm Simonsen repeated this message in an address in the 
Norwegian Aeronautical Association in December 1909.He 
concluded the address with his more general view on air 
power: "The development of military aeronautical vessels will 
most likely lead to no fundamental change in the steady 
development of warfare."" In many ways this quotation sums 
up Holm Simonsen's writing on air power in the period. 
Although he was the first Norwegian officer to write about air 
power's offensive potential, his arguments were somewhat 
ambiguous. He claimed that air power would alter the course 
of modern wars, but he still saw it mainly as a new method to 
fight old wars. The two quotations above show Holm 
Simonsen's ambiguity. If air power was more than simply a 
support weapon for the purpose of reconnaissance and 
observation, it is difficult to see that it was just another 
technological feature in "the steady development of warfare". 
If one looks at Holm Simonsen's technological views he may 
be called a visionary. But his visions about the future did not 
inspire him to go beyond the view that air power was just 
another tool for the wars of his days. In his 1910 article, he 
therefore claimed that "in this context one has to stick to the 
present, not to what a near or distant future might bring.,,70 
Holm Simonsen followed the international development 
quite closely, and he was mostly influenced by Germany. He 
referred to German publications several times, and only on a 
68 Ibid" p. 449, author's translation. 
69 Engelstad 1910, author's translation. The address was printed, see Holm 
Simonsen 1910, pp. 9-10, 14-15, 19-20, 31-32, 33-34. 
70 Ibid., p. 14, author's translation. 
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few occasions British.71 He was a strong believer in the airship 
as the best platform for military use of airspace, a belief 
common in Germany in this period. 
Holm Simonsen seems never to have had any practical 
knowledge of flight. He was selected as a reserve when the 
Norwegian Aeronautical Association was about to educate 
two balloon pilots in 1910, but he probably never obtained 
the certificate.72 Shortly thereafter he moved to Bergen, and 
apparently he then left the aeronautical environment. At least 
he appears to have stopped writing and lecturing about these 
issues around that time.73 
It is not easy to say what impact Holm Simonsen's ideas 
had in Norway. He could be considered a technocrat - at least 
fascinated by new technology - and may therefore not have 
been very influential. When looking at the debate on both 
defence politics and military doctrine in this period in 
Norway, the lack of a technological focus is striking. 
Halfdan Gyth Oehli was the only naval officer to write 
extensively on air power before 1914." The bulk of his 
articles was printed in the Norwegian Maritime Journal 
(Norsk Tidsskrift for S0vcesen) and was of a technological 
" He referred to books by major BaIck (Taktik), major Schmiedecke (Die 
Verkehrsmittel im Kriege), major M6debeck (Taschenbuch fUr 
Flugtechniker und Luftschiffer) and major van ParcevaI (Motorballon und 
Flugmaschine). He also referred to journals like Zeitschrift fur 
Luftschiffahrt und Physik der Atmosphiire, Militiir Wochenblatt and 
Kriegstechnische Zeitschrift. The British references were to the Journal of 
the Royal United Service Institution and to The Journal of the Royal 
Artillery. 
"Engelstad 1910, p. 4. 
73 The reason for this sudden stop in engagement is not known. Holm 
Simonsen had left the south-eastern part of Norway, where the most 
intellectually stimulating aerial environment in Norway was developing, and 
this could be the reason. By 1917 he had not advanced beyond captain, and 
was still a commander of a fortress artillery company in Bergen, see 
Militcerkalender 1917, p. 130. 
,. Personal details from Key,er Barth 1930, p. 114. 
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nature.75 He had studied physics and electronics in Paris in 
1904-05 and again in 1906-07, the latter at L'Ecole 
d'application du Genie Maritime." He obviously had a 
profound interest in the technology of flight, and this led him 
to get an officer scholarship to study at the L'Ecole superieure 
d'Aeronautique et de Construction mecanique in 191011911." 
The technical articles written by Gyth Dehli do not contain 
doctrinal views, and are therefore not particularly interesting 
for this study. What is shown through them, though, is that he 
was up to date with international developments, especially in 
France." He also held, however, views on air power doctrine. 
An article printed in November 1910 summarised how the 
French had used aitships and aeroplanes during an exercise 
conducted 9-18 September 1910. 79 Aeroplanes and airships 
had shown their importance for military operations within 
three areas: 
• carrying orders or information 
• observation and reconnaissance 
• spotting for artillery 
Gyth Dehli concluded with his main view on air power: "We 
will, however, state that it is too early to make any 
assumptions or have hopes that airships or aeroplanes will 
have any other role in a war than carrying orders and 
conducting reconnaissance. ,,80 Gyth Dehli's engagement with 
air power had a practical outcome. He was educated as a pilot 
on a scholarship from Parliament at the Farman pilot school 
" See for instance, Gyth Dehli 1910, pp. 1-24; Gyth Dehli 1910, pp. 74-89; 
Gyth Dehli 1911, pp. 302-310, 349-362. 
76 A school in practical maritime engineering. 
77 The first school for educating engineers on aeronautics in the world. 
7S The same point is made by a series of short news articles that he wrote 
regularly from around February 1910, see for instance Gyth Dehli 1910, pp. 
129-130; Gyth Dehli 1910, pp. 277-278; Gyth Dehli 1911, pp. 50-55. 
" Gyth Dehli 1910, pp. 666-668. 
90 Ibid., p. 668, author's translation. 
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in 1912, became the first Chief of the Navy Air Arm in 1914, 
and the Director of the Navy Aircraft Factory in 1917. In 
1919 he left the aeronautical milieu of the Navy, as he began 
three years of service in the Admiral Staff. He left the armed 
forces in 1922. He was also involved in one of the first 
attempts to establish a civil aviation firm in Norway, as he 
was technical director of the Norsk Luftfartsrederi 
(Norwegian Airline Company) in 1919-20. 
Gyth Dehli falls into the same category as Sem-Jacobsen 
and Holm Simonsen as a thinker on air power. He was not 
willing to speculate on the future of air power, and stated that 
one had to concentrate on what air power could already do. 
Having said that, he was convinced that military commanders 
would benefit tremendously from having such a capacity for 
observation. 
Continental Influence 
German and French thinking mainly influenced the officers 
writing about air power issues in the period. German and 
French were the second languages of Norwegian officers. In 
the public schools and at the University of Oslo, German was 
the foremost second language." In the military, however, it 
was French.82 The concrete references point towards the 
continent, except for a few British ones, and the bulk of the 
literature in the library of the General Staff was French and 
German. 
The Library of the General Staff was the central library and 
reference for officers writing on military matters. It had a 
profound continental approach, and the bulk of the literature 
was of French, Austrian and German origin. By June 1912 the 
" Dahl 2001, p. 42. 
82 Norwegian officers mastered several languages. At least that was the case 
for the officers of the General Staff. As early as 1850, one had to master 
German and French, and have knowledge of English, to become an adjunct 
of the second class in the General Staff, see Haffner 1914, p. 69. 
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library had 28 books on air power. Of these 28 books, 16 
were published in Germany, 11 in France and the last was the 
Norwegian Army's directive for its captive balloon.83 
This orientation was not unusual in Norway in the period. 
French was still in many ways the language of the elite, and 
parts of the officer corps still lived in this tradition. It was 
even stated in the 1901-plan for the War Academy that "it is 
unfortunate if there is anyone amongst the officers of the 
Army who does not have any knowledge of the French 
language. ,,84 
At the same time German influence upon the Norwegian 
military was clear. As in other parts of society, such as 
engineering, the Army learned from Germany. The most 
important writer on military strategy in Norway during this 
period was Gudmund Schnitler. Schnitler became famous for 
his book on the Great War which was published in 1924," 
and later translated into German, Dutch, French and Danish.86 
He had also written a book on Helmuth von Moltke the elder 
in 1896." Besides being a historian, Schnitler was also a 
strategist. In 1911 he published his book on strategy." It 
appeared in a revised edition in 1914." It was clearly 
influenced by contemporary German thought, and was 
received well within the Norwegian Armed Forces." It was 
used as the book on strategy in the courses of the Staff College 
at least until the 1930s. In his obituary it was stated that he 
83 In 1908 a catalogue was published on the contents of the library, see 
Gener.lst.ben, Katalog over Generalstabens bibliotek (Kristiania 1908). In 
addition Norsk Milita3rt Tidsskrift published lists with new titles in each 
quarter of the year. 
84 Quoted in Hosar 2000, p. 173, author's translation. 
" Schnitler 1924. 
86 Schnitler 1926; Schnitler, Den Haag, publishing year unknown; Schnitler 
1928; Schnitler 1939. 
"Schnitler 1896 . 
.. Schnitler 1911. 
" Schnitler 1914. 
'" Lowzow 1914, pp. 617-620. 
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"had exercised an exceptional influence upon several classes 
in the Staff College".91 Schnitler himself served almost his 
entire military career in the General Staff, and taught war 
history and strategy at the Staff College from 1903 to 1925. 
He also travelled widely. He had studied for several years in 
Vienna, Berlin, Copenhagen and Paris. Moreover, he had 
served with the German General Staff for two years, and spent 
half a year at the German Military Academy." 
The small Norwegian air power environment before the 
Great War mirrored the German and French influence. Holm 
Simonsen followed most of his contemporary colleagues in the 
Army and found inspiration from Germany. This is shown in 
his belief in the airship as the platform for air operations. 
Whether it was the fascination for the airship that drove him 
towards Germany or vice versa, is an open question. Sem-
Jacobsen and Gyth Dehli believed in the aircraft as the 
primary platform for air power. Thus they were inspired by, 
and came under the influence of French solutions. Time was 
passing out on Holm Simonsen's view. The airship was very 
expensive, and thus almost unrealistic that a small country 
like Norway could have some. The aeroplane, as in most other 
European countries, was the preferred machine." 
The Response from the Establishment 
The three officers did not meet with enthusiasm from the 
established elements of Norway's military and political 
system. As Rolf Hobson and Tom Kristiansen point out, a 
small group ran Norway's defence establishment." The men of 
this group almost alternated between the most influential 
" "Oberst Gudmund Scbnitler" (obituary), Norsk Milittert Tidsskrift, 1925, 
p. 778. 
n Schnitler got a scholarship from Parliament and served in Germany, with 
both the General Staff and the War Academy from November 1898 to 
October 1900. See Haffner 1914, pp. 165-166; With 1916, p. 796. 
" Woh11994, p. 97. 
94 Hobson and Kristiansen 2001, p. 71. 
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positions, both in politics and in the military. The leading 
defence politicians were without exception officers, and the 
main body of the Defence Ministry was all officers. This 
created an environment of agreement in defence policy, which 
was inherently conservative. For analytical purposes, however, 
the response from the establishment will be separated into two 
bodies. The military, represented by the General and Admiral 
Staff, and politics, represented by the Defence Ministry and 
Parliament, with special emphasis on the Military Committee. 
The Military 
The General Staff seems not to have been particularly 
interested in air power in the period. Only one of the writers 
on these issues was a General Staff officer. In 1913 and 1914 
First Lieutenant Edvard Samuel Larsen Os, an aspirant in the 
Staff, wrote two short articles on air power in the wars in 
Tripoli and the Balkans." 
The history of the General Staff is not yet written, but it 
will briefly be described, so as to explain why it could be 
claimed to be a self-recruiting conservative organism. Until 
1912 the mission of the General Staff was based on 
regulations established in 1872. The Staff was to be the main 
think-thank of the Army. Although it was not specifically 
requested to follow international military developments, this 
was nevertheless one of its goals. It seems, however, that the 
General Staff and the officers working there were not the ones 
who were in the forefront of development. 
In an organisational plan of 1900 the Staff had a total of 33 
officers, of whom 12 were aspirants. In 1911 this number was 
increased to 41, of whom 14 were aspirants." The General 
Staff was based on the system of passage, and the career 
system of the Staff had five levels. Between each level the 
officers served with their regular arms in the Army. The 
"Os 1913, pp. 163-177; Os 1914, pp. 138-152. 
"Moe 1964, pp. 338-339. 
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officers of the Staff took precedence over the officers in the 
rest of the Army, and officers who had served in the Staff 
manned ahnost all important positions in the Army." 
To become an officer of the General Staff one had to be a 
graduate from the Staff College. Normally the top 50 per cent 
from a class were considered as aspirants." The aspirants 
served for four years, in all departments of the Staff. After 
serving as aspirants, the officers went back to positions in 
their own arms, and waited for a vacant position as adjunct, 
the next level in the Staff. This was also held for four years. 
When the four years as adjunct were over, the General Staff 
Officer exam was held. After passing this exam, he became a 
captain, and was qualified to be Chief of Staff at one of the 
six Norwegian Army brigades or a captain in the General 
Staff. 
The officers of the Staff were recruited not only from within 
the system of the Army, but also from within the system of the 
General Staff itself. The eight years of service in the Staff to 
become a General Staff officer were formative for the young 
officers. Since the ones running the Staff were the ones 
educating and qualifying new members for their own 
organisation, the organisation became a near perfect self-
recruiting oligarchy. 
One of the reasons why the General Staff did not involve 
itself in air power matters could be that the organisation did 
not encourage creative young officers to look into matters of 
new technology. Gudmund Schnitler had for instance no 
chapter on air power in his book on strategy, published in 
1911. In his revised edition published three years later, an 
amended chapter dealt with air power, but Schnitler saw it 
only as a means of observation and reconnaissance. The aerial 
~7 Of Norway's 13 Army Generals in 1917. ten were or had been officers of 
the General Staff. 
98 Of the officers enlisted as aspirants in a twenty year period, only two were 
enlisted with lower grades than the average for the Staff College, see Mae 
1964, pp. 343-344. 
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battle was mentioned, but the offensive potential of air power 
was not.99 
Although the General Staff or its personnel did not take the 
initiative in the development of air power in Norway, the 
picture is somewhat qualified by the fact that the General Staff 
made statements on air power matters on several occasions 
from 1909 onwards. These statements came, however, as 
answers to specific questions from, for instance, the Defence 
Ministry. The responses from the General Staff were not 
always negative towards air power; they were simply answers 
to questions they had received. 
As with the General Staff, the Admiral Staff was not in the 
forefront of development. There was only one officer writing 
on air power in the Admiral Staff, Edgar Otto. He wrote a 
prize-winning article on air power in 1910. The Norwegian 
Admiral Staff was a lot younger and smaller than the General 
Staff was. It had been established in 1899, and in 1908 it 
consisted only of six officers. The Admiral Staff was to give 
advice and pursue planning with special emphasis on defence 
and mobilisation plans, organisation and exercises.!OO The 
history of the Admiral Staff has neither been written. But the 
main points made about the General Staff are probably as 
valid for the Admiral Staff. 
The Norwegian General Staff thus played quite a different 
role in the development of Norwegian air power than was the 
case in Germany and Austria-Hungary. As John H. Morrow 
has shown, the German General Staff, and its counterpart in 
Austria-Hungary, put constant pressure upon their 
governments to develop air power in the years before 1914. In 
those countries it was the political authorities that were 
sceptical.!O! In Germany the War Ministry's view on air power 
changed in 1912, possibly as an effect of the Morocco crisis in 
" Schnitler 1914, pp. 271-274. 
"" Meyer 1914, p. 154. 
'"' Morrow 1976, pp. 115-117. 
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1911 and the Balkan Wars in 1912. In Austria-Hungary this 
change never occurred, being the main reason for that 
country's unpreparedness in air power when the war began. In 
Norway, the situation was the opposite. As will be shown, it 
was the Defence Ministry that engaged first in the matter, in 
1909. 
Although the General and Admiral Staff were slow 
regarding the development of the new air weapon, some high-
ranking individual officers showed a special interest in air 
power. The foremost of those was Haakon Ditlef Lowzow. 
His engagement as a Minister of Defence is covered below. 
Towards the end of 1911, he served as the General Inspector 
of the Cavalry, and proposed to the Defence Ministry that 
Norway should educate pilots immediately. In October 1911 
the Commanding Admiral, Karl Friedrich Griffin Dawes, sent 
a proposal to the Defence Ministry recommending the 
purchase of an aircraft and the education of pilots. This was 
also a part of his initial proposal for the new plan for the 
Norwegian Navy, the so-called Fleet plan of 1912, but when 
the proposal became policy, air power was not part of it.!OZ 
When the Norwegian Aeronautic Association was formed 
at a meeting in Oslo in May 1909, Lieutenant General 
Christian Wilhelm Bredal 0lss0n became its deputy 
chairman.!03 Olss('m was at that time Inspector General of the 
Fortress Artillery. The year after General 0lss0n left the 
position, but was followed by Major General Johan 
Christopher Rreder, then the Inspector General of the 
Engineering Arm. It seems, however, that neither of the two 
generals was that active in the work of the Aeronautical 
Association. General Rreder had, however, as a part of his 
proposal regarding the restructuring of the Engineering Arm 
102 Henriksen 1994, p. 20. 
M Feiring 1957, p. 278. 
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in connection to the Army Plan of 1909, proposed to establish 
a military ballooning unit within that Arm.IO< 
That the military establishment in Norway was not that 
interested in the development of military flight needs also to 
be qualified by the fact that the two central journals within 
the military showed interest in the matter. Both the 
Norwegian Military Journal and the Norwegian Maritime 
Journal printed articles on air power issues. In addition the 
yearly article prize contest in the Norwegian Military Journal 
was used to inspire officers to write on air power. The 
committee that suggested the titles was formed by the 
Kristiania Militrere Samfund, and was constituted by high-
ranking officers from different arms. 10' Each year the contest 
was announced in the journal. The committee suggested 
between 15 and 30 titles. The first time air power was 
suggested was in 1905, when the committee proposed the 
following title: "Should a balloon service be a part of the 
Army, and if so, how should such a capacity be organised?"I06 
In 1906 this title was repeated. In 1909 the committee again 
suggested an air power theme: "Shooting from and against 
balloons and airships" .107 The title suggests that the committee 
saw a possible offensive weapon in air power as early as 1909. 
This title suggestion was repeated in the announcement of the 
prize contest both in 1910 and 1911, although aeroplanes had 
104 Stortingsproposisjon 50/1909, p. 141. 
105 As an example, the committee in 1912 consisted of the following 
members: Major General Lowzow (Inspector General of the Cavalry); 
Major General Bull (Commandant at Akershus Fortress and the 2"' 
Combined Brigade); Colonel Frerden (Commandant of the 1" Field Artillery 
Regiment); Lieutenant Colonel Munthe (Commandant of the Valdres 
Infantry Battalion); and Lieutenant Colonel Sejersted (Head of the 
Communications Department in the General Staff). 
106 "Det militrere tidsskrifts prisopgaver for 1905", Norsk Militcert 
Tidsskrift, 211905, p. 128, author's translation. 
107 "Det militrere tidsskrifts prisopgaver for 1909", Norsk Militcert 
Tidsskrift, 211909, p. 126, author's translation. 
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been added to the text by 1911.108 In 1913 three of the 
suggested 18 titles were on air power. 1" One or several titles 
on air power continued each year also after 1913, but it was 
not until 1922 that an officer delivered an article on air 
power. HO First Lieutenant Einar Haganes wrote on the 
development of the Army Air Arm.111 In the Army, most 
officers sending in articles were officers of the General Staff. 
The lack of articles on air power in the contest enhances the 
argument that the General Staff was not very interested in air 
power matters. 
The Norwegian Maritime Journal also had an article prize 
contest. From 1911 until at least 1917 the committee 
suggested the following title: "What influence will airships 
and aeroplanes have on our Navy?,,112It seems as though 
nobody replied to the challenge from the committee, although 
Halfdan Gyth Dehli had submitted an article on air power to 
the contest already in 1909, without winning an award. H3 The 
year after Captain Edgar Otto of the Admiral Staff also 
delivered an article on "Aeronautics and the Navy", and 
earned a silver medal.H4 
Why then did the pilots not write articles? As shown, the 
first Norwegian pioneers did, but the next generation of 
airmen did not. Such a question can have only speculative 
answers, but the breed of men joining up for the first pilot 
ttaining courses of the Army and Navy were definitely not 
108 "Det militrere tidsskrifts prisopgaver for 1910", Norsk Militcert 
Tidsskrift, 2/1910, p. 105; "Det milit",re tidsskrifts prisopgaverfor 1911", 
Norsk Milit<ert Tidsskrift, 311911, p. 176, author's translation. 
109 "Norsk militaert tidsskrifts prisopgaver for 1913", Norsk Militcert 
Tidsskrift, 3-411913, pp. 222-223. 
110 Christophersen 1930, pp. 209-222, gives an overview of all articles found 
worthy of a medal. 
111 The article was awarded with the silver mt:dal, see Haganes 1922, pp. 
324-380,399-419,455-466,519-528,587-597. 
112 Author's translation. 
m Gyth Dehli 1910. 
114 Unfortunately, it has not been possible to find this article. 
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academics. As an example, Tancred Ibsen, a Lieutenant within 
the Army, and grandson of both Bjernstjerne Bjernson and 
Henrik Ibsen, joined the pilot school at Kjeller in 1917. Ibsen 
later became a famous film director, and wrote his 
autobiography.'" Reading it, one is struck by the fact that the 
only thing Ibsen writes about his military career is his 
adventures. There are details about his record-breaking 
flights, his trip to Trondheim over the mountains, his first 
looping-the-loop and his first Immelmann. The book says 
almost nothing about military pilot training. This could be 
due to several reasons. It could be that Ibsen, thinking such 
stories would be too boring, did not write about them. Or it 
could be that life in the Army Air Arm was seen as an 
adventure, risking one's life in the hunt for the skies. The 
answer may lie somewhere between these two hypotheses. 
What is quite certain is that men like Tancred Ibsen, did not 
write articles on air power development or doctrine. If the 
men of the early days of Norwegian military flight were of 
Ibsen's breed, no wonder that there was not much thought on 
the development of doctrine or strategy within the air arms. 
The Political Response 
When Minister of Defence Lowzow, at that time a Lieutenant 
Colonel in the Army, forwarded his budget proposition for 
the fiscal period June 1909-June 1910, he had made his 
ministry write an annex on air power. Lowzow proposed that 
Parliament vote 10 000 NOK for the study of aerial warfare 
and the testing of guns to shoot down aircraft. Lowzow 
believed that developments in Europe were bringing war to 
the air, and that Norway had to follow this development. 
Lowzow was a stubborn cavalry officer with a reputation in 
the corps as being too creative. He was controversial in both 
political and military circles and heavily engaged in the 
nationalist defence organisation Norwegian Defence League 
115 Ibsen 1976. 
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(Norges Forsvarsforening) from its beginning in 1886.116 In 
military circles he was deemed too fast and too different. 
During an exercise in 1901 he had "disappeared" with his 
cavalry company for eight days; telling his superiors 
nothing. 117 In 1936, his military biographer, General 
Laurantzon, stated that Lowzow was controversial because 
"he came up with too many new things. ,,118 When this creative 
and unorthodox officer became Minister of Defence, he 
immediately proposed to look into the issue of air power. 
Lowzow mainly used a defensive argument for his proposal. 
If Norway could be attacked from the air it would have to 
create a defence. Lowzow appealed to the central proposition 
of Norwegian defence doctrine, that its sole task was to 
engage attackers against Norwegian soil. Lowzow got no 
support in the Military Committee. Although the Committee 
thought it necessary for Norway to follow carefully 
developments in aviation, it considered the budget to be too 
small to tolerate such a grant. Lowzow took the rostrum in 
Parliament the day the budget was debated. He did not raise 
his proposal for funding again, but made a lengthy argument 
for his views on air power. He repeated his point about 
defence against air attack - and claimed that Norway would 
have to prepare itself for what was to come in a possible war. 
That was probably also the reason why he specifically 
mentioned trials with the use of land-based guns for shooting 
down airships and aircraft.119 
Lowzow was the first politician actually to propose funding 
for air power in Norway. He lacked, however, political talent, 
m For more on Lowzow's contrDversiality, see Agay 2001, pp. 55-56, 78-
86,189; Castberg 1953, pp. 17-18. 
'" Agay 2001, p. 189. 
m Laurantzon 1938, p. 463, author's translation. 
119 Stortingsforhandlingerl1909, VIIa, 2323. The suggested amount was 
small, considered the size of the whole budget for the Army. The Army 
budget for 1909 totalled 13,5 million NOK. Lowzow's proposal amounted 
to about 0,7 per thousand of the total budget. 
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and was constantly in trouble with Parliament in his 16 
months as Minister of Defence.'" Hobson and Kristiansen 
have termed him "inflexible and incautious in parliamentary 
matters. ,,12' But he got retrospective admiration for his views 
on air power from one unlikely source - the eager anti-
militarist and socialist Adam Egede-Nissen.'" 
The offensive potential of air power naturally brought its 
corollary, the question of how one would defend oneself 
against an attack from the air. The defensive aspect of air 
power suited Norwegian defence policy quite well. In the eyes 
of the Army, war would be fought against an invading Army 
from the east, most likely from Sweden. This view dominated 
Norwegian threat evaluation at least until around 1911, in the 
Army possibly longer.'" 
If Sweden were to attack Norway the most obvious axis 
would be from the area along the Swedish border towards the 
capital Oslo, and in the countryside in Tmndelag. Both these 
areas of operation suited the observation role of air power 
well. The countryside was relatively flat, at least by 
Norwegian standards. This evaluation also lay behind the 
positioning of Norway's first rwo airbases. The first 
positioned at Kjeller was close - but not too close - to both 
the capital and the Swedish border. Vrernes, the second land-
based airbase established was positioned in the middle of 
Tmndelag, the other main axis in case of a Swedish attack. 
The propagandists for the development of Norwegian air 
power met a problem when arguing for a defence against 
aerial attacks. To argue that a defence against aerial warfare 
could be established with air defence artillery could be counter 
productive if one wanted aeroplanes. The point was therefore 
stressed, especially by Sem-Jacobsen, that it would be very 
U" Nissen 1933, pp. 267, 271. 
121 Hobson and Kristiansen 2001, p. 42. 
m Egede-Nissen 1945, pp. 136-137. 
123 Hobson and Kristiansen 2001, p. 71; Berg 1995, p. 65. 
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difficult to shoot down moving objects in the air. Rifle fire 
was not suitable; the bullets were too small and did not go 
high enough. Air defence artillery was the only possible 
solution, but that too would be very difficult, because the 
targets were moving. The propagandists for the development 
of Norwegian air power capabilities had to strike a balance in 
this respect. They could not argue that air power was an 
offensive weapon per se. At the same time they could not 
overemphasise the defensive aspect, since that might lead to 
the development of air defence artillery, which presumably 
would lead to a lesser development of military flight. A focus 
on the use of air power mainly as a means for observation 
therefore fitted very well for both the propagandists and 
Norwegian defence doctrine. 
Mter Lowzow's proposal in 1909, two years elapsed before 
the Defence Ministry again considered funding for air power. 
The Inspector General of the Engineering Arm, General 
Rreder, proposed to allocate funding for the purchase of an 
aeroplane. The Ministry, however, considered the 
development of aircraft immature, and did not propose any 
funding when the budget was announced.'" The Military 
Committee in Parliament agreed with the Ministry, but found 
it necessary that Norway follow international developments, 
suggesting the grant of 1000 NOK as a scholarship for the 
study of aerial flight and wireless.'" The proposal was 
sanctioned by Parliament after a rather short debate. The 
majority in Parliament was, however, very small, SS voted for, 
51 against.'" The scholarship was awarded to Sem-Jacobsen, 
who was already in France to become an aerial engineer. In 
the same budget, the Defence Ministry proposed and the 
Military Committee and Parliament agreed to give 1500 NOK 
124 Srortingsproposisjon 1/1911, p. 94. 
'" lndst. S. X.l1911, p. 30. 
m Stortingsforhandlingerl1911, VIIa, pp. 878-880. 
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to the work of the Norwegian Aeronautical Association. Thus, 
the first official funding for air power was awarded in 1911. 
In 1912 the scenario was nearly repeated, but now the 
Defence Ministry itself proposed to grant 1000 NOK for a 
scholarship."7 The Military Committee agreed, but raised the 
amount to 2000 NOK in its proposal to Parliament. The 
Committee also stated that "it was very interested in the 
purchase of aircraft and the education of pilots", and it 
therefore asked the Ministry to try to find money for those 
purposes in next year's budget.'" In the debate that followed 
in Parliament, Prime Minister Jens Bratlie himself took the 
rostrum, and said that he was very eager that Norway acquire 
aircraft as soon as possible. Therefore, he had arranged a 
proposition to Parliament for the education of pilots and the 
study of air power. Parliament sanctioned the proposal for 
2000 NOK for a scholarship. Only eight members voted 
against.'29 In the treatment of the Navy budget the same year, 
the Commanding Admiral, Admiral Dawes, proposed to 
allocate money for the purchase of an aeroplane, but the 
Defence Ministry did not put this proposal to Parliament, 
allegedly for economic reasons. 130 The Military Committee 
again repeated its wish that the Ministry find money for the 
purchase of aeroplanes in next year's budget.'" 
Only six days after Dons' flight in June 1912, the Defence 
Ministry announced proposition 107, proposing to award at 
least three scholarships to officers to become military pilots.'" 
The Ministry began by referring to international 
developments, and concluded that military flight now had 
come of age as a means of observation, both for the Army and 
Navy. Norway ought therefore to take the first steps towards 
127 Stortingsproposisjon 111912, p. 154. 
12lI Indst. S. X.l1912, p. 43, author'S translation. 
'" Storting,forhandlingerl1912, VIIb, pp. 1923-1928. 
130 Stortingsproposisjon 111912, p. 45. 
m Ind,t. S. IIJ1912, p. 18. 
m Storting'proposisjon 10711912. 
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the development of military aviation. The Ministry saw these 
scholarships only as a first step. The proposition mentioned 
the creation of a pilot school, the possible purchase of aircraft, 
and a future military fiying corps. In a short proposal to 
Parliament the Military Committee, with the exception of 
Egede-Nissen, agreed with the Defence Ministry."3 Only 
twelve days after the Ministry'S proposal, it was sanctioned by 
Parliament with only eight votes against.13' 
The political authorities were not unfriendly towards the 
development of air power in Norway. But neither can they be 
deemed eager in their efforts to allocate money to the cause. 
As to the doctrinal issues debated in political documents and 
sessions in Parliament, they were few. Air power was regarded 
by most as an instrument for observation. Member of 
Parliament Johan Hestnes spoke of the possibility of aerial 
bombing in the debate in 1911, and he saw it as such a 
terrible weapon that it could abolish war. Hestnes meant that 
air power, without anything to stop it, would bomb cities, 
castles and history itself to pieces. If nations got that capacity, 
they would think twice before waging war. None of the other 
. d H ,. 13' representatIves commente on estnes VIew. 
The next year, the Defence Ministry forwarded proposition 
147, the largest and most detailed proposition on air power 
before the First World War. They now raised several doctrinal 
questions about the development of air power. The Minisrry 
saw in the air weapon first and foremost a means for 
observation and reconnaissance. It referred to international 
developments and also to the experiences of the Italian-
Turkish War of 1911-12 and of the first and second Balkan 
Wars of 1912-13. Air power had been important, especially 
as a means for observation and reconnaissance. The Ministry 
also saw the possibilities for air-to-air combat and for 
m Tillreg 4 til indst. S.xJ1912. 
,,. Stortingsforhandlinger/1912, Vllb, p. 2335. 
'" StortingsforhandlingerI1911, Vlla, p. 879. 
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bombing from the air. With regards to bombing, the Ministry 
mentioned in particular rear-area targets such as headquarters, 
depots and railways. The Ministry concluded this discussion 
by making the point that military flight was immature 
regarding offensive use and, because of that, Norwegian air 
units were to be established primarily for observation and 
reconnaissance purposes. Aerial observation was deemed 
especially suitable for Norwegian terrain and topography, 
since the cavalry had limitations in the fjords and mountains 
of western and northern Norway.13'The Ministry's view on air 
power was exactly the same as Sem-Jacobsen's. This parity is 
so striking that it is hardly coincidental. It is not unlikely that 
Sem-Jacobsen wrote the introduction to the proposition. If 
that was not the case, it is quite obvious that the officials in 
the Ministry had read Sem-Jacobsen's articles. 
Debates in Parliament also saw air power as a means for 
observation and reconnaissance. This was especially clear 
when Parliament debated proposition 147. The Defence 
Minister, Wilhelm Keilhau, emphasised this role, along with 
representatives Kragtorp (Liberal) and Michelet 
(Conservative)."7 In addition to this, several members of 
Parliament realised that this would lead to air power taking 
over some of the other arms' roles. When the Military 
Committee delivered its recommendation to the proposition, it 
wanted the Ministry to evaluate whether other arms of the 
Army could save the amount of money spent on the 
development of air power, thus not increasing the total Army 
budget."" On several occasions in 1912-14, some Members of 
Parliament pointed out that an evaluation was lacking from 
the Defence Ministry on what the Army could save on its 
traditional arms when air power was introduced.'39 The 
136 Stortingsproposisjon 14711913, pp. 3-4. 
'" Stortingsforhandlinger/1913, VIIb, pp. 2651-2667. 
u. Tillreg 9 til indst. S.X./1913, p. 5. 
m See for instance the debate in Parliament 24 July 1913 when proposition 
147 was debated. Especially Gausdal (Labour), meant that the Defence 
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Ministry seems, however, never to have given any such 
evaluation. 
Although both military experts and politicians considered 
the observation/reconnaissance role to be the primary role for 
aircraft in this period, several speakers in Parliament 
mentioned the offensive role of air power. Most of them had a 
defensive perspective - i.e. how Norway would defend itself 
against this new threat. l40 There is little indication that there 
existed any thoughts in political circles on developing 
offensive air power in Norway. 
Why Should Norway Develop Air Power? 
In the debates on how air power would be used in the 
Norwegian armed forces, several arguments were used to 
show that the development of Norwegian air power had to be 
different from that of the larger nations of Europe. This 
argument was partly based on facts. Norway was a small 
nation that could not compete with France, Britain and 
Germany. It could, however, also be argued that Norwegians 
in this period had a profound interest in showing how special 
Norway was. At least until 1914 a strong nationalist wind 
blew in Norwegian life, debate and culture. It was important 
to show how unique the Norwegian way of life was. '" As 
both Peter Fritzsche and Robert Wohl have pointed out, 
nationalism and the development of aviation went hand in 
hand in pre-war Europe, in Germany exemplified by the 
willingness of the German people to contribute money to Graf 
Zeppelin's wrecked airship L.ZA in 1908.142 
Ministry should have considered what could be saved in the Cavalry Arm, 
see Stortingsforhandlingerl1913, Vllh, pp. 2651-2667. 
HO See for instance the debate in Parliament 24 July 1913 when proposition 
147 was debated. Both Mj"en (Working Class Democrats, a small labour 
party associated with the Liberals) and Michelet (Conservative) mentioned 
the offensive potential of air power, see ibid. 
141 For more on Norwegian nationalism, see S.erensen 1998. 
'" Fritzsche 1992, p. 2, 15-18; Woh11994. 
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Several scholars have recently claimed that this influenced 
Norwegian defence doctrine in particular. '43 The Norwegian 
way of life - non-urban and close to nature - was reflected in 
the Norwegian view on warfare. As Nina Witoszek has shown 
in her study of Norwegian cultural history, Norwegians 
preferred nature instead of culture. '44 In addition the 
egalitarian Norwegian farming societies were considered as 
the real Norwegian way of life. This led Norwegian doctrine 
to emphasise such an aspect as conscription, which fitted very 
well into Norwegian society. The view also trickled down to 
the tactical level of war. Troops were to exploit the harsh 
topography and climate to attack the less mobile enemy in his 
flanks. Although the Norwegian Army trained mainly during 
the summer, Norwegian topography and climate was seen as a 
major force multiplier, since all Norwegians were capable of 
surviving under such conditions, implying that foreigners 
could not. A mechanised technological and professional Army 
could not do that job, since such a development would lead to 
Norwegian forces fighting on the invaders' terms. Lieutenant 
Colonel Sophus Christensen's study of Norwegian defence 
policy from 1911, pointed out that topography was the 
Norwegian Army's foremost ally.145 The mental picture was 
strengthened by the images of men such as Fridtjof Nansen 
and Roald Amundsen, the most popular Norwegians of the 
period. Although Amundsen especially was eager to exploit 
new technology - he was the first to get a Norwegian pilot's 
certificate in 1914 - the picture of men on skis fighting the 
powers of nature was strong in the Norwegian mentality-
and hence in the Norwegian Army. Parts of the Norwegian 
military doctrine of the period could be characterised as anti-
modernist. 
'" Ulriksen 2002; Friis 2000. 
''" Witoszek 1998. 
145 Christensen 1913, p. 13 in amendment. 
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This doctrine was, however, problematic. The country's 
most densely populated areas, as well as most of its industry, 
were situated in the south and southeast, where the 
countryside is flatter, although with large forests. Thus a 
Norwegian Army that was to fight in the mountains would 
not defend what can be termed the country's obvious centre of 
gravity. Ken Booth has argued that one cannot free thinking 
on strategy from the broader cultural impact of the nation 
state and period in which it is developing. He is of the opinion 
that the impact of culture on strategy has been 
underdeveloped. His book can be read as a reaction to the 
creation of the rational actor in strategic studies. He claims 
that the idea of rationality is at the centre of western strategic 
thinking, and that the rational strategic man has to be 
replaced by the national strategic man, and argues for what he 
terms strategic relativism. '46 He writes that: 
If strategic studies are to be improved, it is necessary to 
embrace more completely the idea of strategic relativism, the 
idea that truth in strategy is relative to the individual or group 
in question and to the time and place in which the individual 
147 
or group acts. 
This argument is most certainly valid regarding the 
Norwegian development of strategy in this period. 
This anti-modernist aspect of warfare stood in sharp 
contrast to other military thinkers of the period. Technology 
was seen by some as the ultimate weapon of such a small 
nation as Norway. Technology could compensate for the lack 
of numbers. This would be important, since no matter whom 
Norway would fight it would almost certainly be 
outnumbered. Norway ought therefore to have armed forces 
of good technological standard. Air power fitted very well in 
H. Booth 1979, especially pp. 16-18,63,152. 
,., Ibid., p. 139. 
54 FORSVARSSTUDIER 5/2004 
this doctrine, especially since aircraft were relatively cheap 
compared with other military equipment. 
Thus, the Norwegian view on the aeroplane as a medium of 
war was rather paradoxical. A clear anti-modernist tradition 
within parts of the population and parts of the Army was 
coupled with a fascination for new technology. An enemy 
equipped with modern weapons could be defeated on land by 
the Norwegians if they exploited Norway's topography. This 
was not possible with an enemy having aerial weapons. Air 
power would not be that limited by topography. The 
Norwegian way of warfare was thus threatened by the 
invention of the aeroplane, since an enemy using air power 
could only be defeated in the same environment. 
To persuade the public opinion that air power was 
important, the argument most frequently used was that 
Norway would soon be the only country without any capacity 
in the air. Usually this referred to developments in the larger 
nations of Europe claiming that Norway was not following 
developments. Sem-Jacobsen wrote in 1912: "We are already 
considerably outdistanced in comparison to those with whom 
we may have to fight" .148 Who was Norway going to fight? In 
the years after 1905, Sweden was portrayed as the main threat 
towards Norway. By 1912 this picture had changed, and the 
possibility of a war between the great powers in Europe, with 
a possible war in the North Sea, emerged as the central 
challenge to Norwegian sovereignty. It should be mentioned, 
though, that parts of the Army clung to the Swedish scenario, 
in the words of Rolf Hobson and Tom Kristiansen, "for 
. . . I " 149 Th ill mstltutlOna reasons . e new t eat assessment 
culminated in the Fleet Plan of 1912, which made the Navy 
better suited to defend Norway's neutrality in case of a war in 
the North Sea. The lack of proper defences in Northern-
Norway against Russia was, according to Roald Berg, a reflex 
148 Sem-Jacobsen 1912, author's translation. 
149 Hobson and Kristiansen 2001, p. 71, author's translation. 
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based upon the most likely scenario, a major war in the North 
Sea. The Morocco crisis of 1911 had enhanced this scenario. 
When the crisis peaked, large parts of the German fleet had 
been in Norwegian waters, a fact that worried Parliament and 
public opinion. The Defence Minister, Karl Sigwald Johannes 
Bull, had drawn the conclusion that the Norwegian Navy 
needed to face west and north - in defence against the great 
powers. However, such a war was not seen as very likely. Few 
believed in a major war in Europe. Roald Berg explains the 
reason for this in two dimensions, first that the great powers 
would fight over their colonies, and second that the general 
positivism encouraged the belief that war between civilised 
nations was both impossible and irrational.!SO 
In 1913 Lieutenant Colonel Sophus Christensen wrote a 
book on Norway's strategic situation. m The book was printed 
in 2000 copies, but not published for sale, since Christensen 
himself was of the opinion that it contained material that 
could hurt Norway in intelligence matters. The book was 
revised in 1915,152 and has been interpreted as one of the main 
reasons for a defence friendly movement in the years before 
the First World War.m Even key politicians, such as Johan 
Castberg, had come across Christensen's views.!54 Christensen 
was extreme in his militaristic views. He got his inspiration 
from Germany and Prussia, and claimed that radical reforms 
had to begin in the Army. His study also represented, 
however, the change in Norway's threat assessment. Although 
Sweden was mentioned as a possible foe, the dominant 
scenario was a possible war in the North Sea. Christensen 
claimed that both Great Britain and Germany would try to 
secure a base on the southern or southwestern coast of 
Norway. Christensen also emphasised the possibility of war 
H" Berg 1995, pp. 65-68, 181. 
JS1 Christensen 1913. 
152 Christensen 1915. 
'" Ulriksen 2002, p. 107; Selboe 1952, pp. 68-83. 
'" Castberg 1953, p. 80. 
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with the Russians, and claimed that they would have to 
pursue their advance towards the Atlantic through Norway.'55 
Another example of the same threat evaluation was found in 
Lieutenant Commander Christian Meyer's book of 1914, 
where he argued that Norway was unprepared for the most 
possible scenario, a war between the great powers in the 
North Sea. Meyer was of the opinion that both the Germans 
and the British would want to establish some sort of base on 
h N . 156 t e orweglan coast. 
In his attempts to convince public opinion that Norway 
alone was soon to be without aircraft, Sem-Jacobsen 
exaggerated somewhat. The only countries that by 1912 had 
what can be termed an air power capability in Europe were 
France and Germany. Only three years had elapsed since 
France had established its first military aircraft units. At the 
beginning of 1912, the French had about 150 aircraft, not all 
of them operational. Germany followed as Europe's second 
largest air power nation, but it had directed its main effort to 
the development of airships. The British were sadly behind, 
while the Russians at this point had only training aircraft. IS' If 
the comparison had been with more similar countries, such as 
Sweden or Denmark, Norway would not have looked like a 
straggler. In Sweden the first military flight took place in 
February 1912. It was Lieutenant Dahlbeck who flew the 
Swedish Navy's first aircraft. The Swedish Army got its first 
aircraft during the summer of 1912. '58 The Danes had started 
a civilian flying school partly sponsored by the military in 
1911, but there was no organised military aerial activity 
before the summer of 1912, when the Danish Armed Forces 
got their first two aircraft as private gifts.'" 
155 Christensen 1913, pp. 14-15, 118. 
'" Meyer 1914, especially pp. 96, 124. 
157 Morrow 1976, p. 1-57. 
"" Annerfalk 1996, pp. 17-22. 
H' Sch",der 2001, pp. 5-7. 
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The development of air power in Norway was also seen in a 
broader cultural perspective. Norway was striving to become 
a modern state alongside other European nations. As a 
newborn independent nation it was important to show that it 
was becoming a modern industrialised state. The Minister of 
Defence from February 1913, Wilhelm Keilhau, used this 
argument to try to convince Parliament of the necessity of 
developing an Army Air Arm when he put forward 
proposition 147.160 Keilhau argued that Norway had already 
participated in socio-cultural and technological developments 
for decades, and that the development of flight was an area of 
such great importance that Norway ought to participate. He 
claimed that the plan for an air arm of the Army therefore had 
to be considered from a broader perspective. Norway had not 
been sitting on the fence watching progress in Europe in other 
areas. Manned flight was a large breakthrough for mankind. 
He played on the strings of nationality, and explicitly referred 
to the achievements of both Nansen and Amundsen. Against 
this background Keilhau argued that "we should be obliged to 
and feel the commitment to participate in the effort to 
conquer the air. ,,161 In the same debate, Member of Parliament 
Lasse Torkelson Trredal (Liberal) stated that there would be 
more honour and glory for those who were in it from the 
beginning, than those who joined when the development had 
matured.l62 Both Keilhau and Trredal argued directly against 
the epigonism that was present in Parliament, an epigonism 
that will be discussed later. 
Aviation was in the beginning driven by civilians in most 
countries. Although they usually saw its military potential 
quite quickly, as the Wright brothers did, aviation was also 
seen as a major cultural development for mankind. Man 
would be rid of his earthly bounds. A long-held dream of 
"" StortingsforhandlingerI1913, VlIb, pp. 2653-2655. 
161 Ibid" p. 2654, author's translation. 
'" Ibid., pp. 2651-2667. 
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humanity had come to life. As the arguments above show, 
several Norwegians argued that Norway therefore ought to 
take part in this development from the very beginning. The 
development of aviation in Norway was, on the other hand, 
quite different from that of other nations, since it was mainly 
officers who were involved. Aviation quickly acquired a 
military dimension, but Norway was not at the forefront of 
military development in the world. Therefore this combination 
of the military and aviation could lead to a problematic 
symbiosis for the development of aviation itself. But it can be 
claimed that the greater cultural meaning of manned flight 
itself to some degree removed this possible problem. For small 
nations like Norway, this could mean a position amongst the 
greatest in some aspects. The country could not compete with 
the great powers in Europe in the military field. But being 
small was no hindrance to being great in other areas in which 
mankind was prospering. As W.e. Bragger and Nordahl 
Rolfsen put it in their seminal biography of Fridtjof Nansen in 
1896 "It is not in the area of war that the small nations can 
compete and defend their sovereignty. It is in the area of 
culture, civilisation, science and art. ,,163 
The aeroplane offered the possibility of both at the same 
time. It was just what Defence Minister Keilhau was arguing. 
The development of military aviation in Norway had two 
dimensions - air power and as a task for mankind in the name 
of civilisation and modernity. 
Two other arguments in favour of air power development 
were profound in Parliament. Both had their foundation in the 
fact that air power relied on relatively cheap technology. 
First and foremost, some considered technology a tool that 
could compensate for inferiority in numbers. Member of 
Parliament Ivar Aavatsmark made this point in a debate about 
the development of Norwegian flight in 1912,164 and repeated 
163 Quoted in Stenseth 2000, p. 133, author's translation. 
, .. Stortingsforhandlingerl1912, VIIb, p. 1924. 
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it in the debate on proposition 147 in 1913.165 Aavatsmark, 
who represented the Liberal party, was one of the leading 
politicians on military questions in the period from 1905 to 
1925. The Military Committee also used this argument in its 
recommendation to Parliament about the development of the 
Army Air Arm in 1913.166 Both Aavatsmark and the 
Committee pointed to a constant problem in Norwegian 
defence planning: whomever the country was going to fight, it 
would almost certainly be outnumbered. 
Enhancing this argument was the low price of aeroplanes. 
Compared to the two dreadnoughts Norway was planning to 
purchase, the price of an aeroplane was negligibly low. '67 
Because of this, air power was argued to be a cost-effective 
means for a small nation. The Defence Ministry made this 
point in proposition 147. Air power was an area of military 
armament where small nations were able to compete with the 
larger nations of Europe, at least to some degree.'" The 
Military Committee followed this line of argument, claiming 
that "The majority of the Committee see in the Air Arm a 
possible future weapon that, with not too extensive funding, 
could make a great contribution to the country's defence." 16' 
Other politicians also used the cost-effectiveness aspect of 
air power as an argument in Parliament. Both Alf Mj0en 
(Socialist) and Christian Fredrik Michelet (Conservative) 
mentioned this aspect in the debate about proposition 147.'70 
Michelet claimed that in the future, it would be quite easy to 
sink a dreadnought with bombs from an aeroplane, and that 
'" Stortingsforhandlingerl1913, VIIb, p. 2661-
'" Tillreg 9 til Indstilling S. X.!1913. 
167 When the Army Air Arm planned to pruchase its fIrst aircraft in 1914, 
the price was estimated to be 20000 NOK, see Stortingsproposisjon 111914, 
p. 183. The price of one of the small dreadnoughts that Norway planned to 
aquire from Britain in the fleet plan of 1912 was 7,5 million NOK, see 
Stortingsproposisjon 2611912, p. 18. 
168 Srortingsproposisjon 14711913, p. 3. 
16~ Tillreg 9 ril Indstilling S. X.l1913, p. 5, author's translation. 
"" StortingsforhandlingerI1913, VIIb, pp. 2655-2656, 2660. 
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this would be a very cost-effective way of warfare that 
Norway ought to pursue. 
Why should Norway not develop air power? 
The politicians who argued for the development of air power 
met some, but not much opposition. With the exception of the 
anti-militaristic Labour Party, it is not possible to see any 
difference in the political parties' views on air power. 
Some early Norwegian thinkers argued that the aeroplane 
would be so terrible a weapon that it would make an end to 
war. No sane politician would go to war, having created such 
a fiery weapon, which, if its potential was brought to its 
maximum could endanger civilisation itself.171 This argument 
was also used by the first man who actually flew in Norway, 
the Swedish Baron Carl van Cederstmm, who, after being 
invited by the Norwegian Aeronautic Association in 1910, 
flew several display flights in the autumn of that year in Oslo. 
He claimed that air power would be such a dangerous weapon 
that it would make war impossible. m 
Labour was strongly anti-militaristic in this period, and its 
representatives in Parliament used every occasion to 
promulgate this view, both as members of the Military 
Committee and in Parliament. Thus the Labour Party was in 
principal negative to developments in air power. For instance, 
in a debate in Parliament in 1912, Adam Egede-Nissen stated 
"I find it a lot more important to teach people how to brush 
their teeth than to teach them to become aviators.,,173 The 
political influence of Labour was, however, not that strong in 
this period. Although it was a fast growing political party, it 
had not much actual power in Parliament. Almost all 
decisions in military matters went against them. Labour did 
not reflect the more general view of Parliament in this period. 
171 This view was for instance put forward by Aars 1910, pp. 522-527. 
m Meyer 1973, p. 13. 
173 Stortingsforhandlinger/1912, VIIb, p. 1928, author's translation. 
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The attitude of Parliament towards air power is better 
described as a mixture of curiosity and positivism coupled 
with a huge amount of what can be termed epigonism. 
In 1901, engineer officer Clare Sewel! Widerberg wrote 
about the development of the Engineering Arm. '74 The article 
contained a lengthy section on the use of balloons for military 
purposes. Widerberg pointed to the fact that Norway was one 
of the very few countries in Europe without any balloons in 
service. What is interesting is that he devoted a large part of 
the article to argue against the scepticism that had been shown 
towards balloons. He argued that such scepticism was no 
longer valid, since balloons were in extensive use in the rest of 
Europe. Widerberg's effort against this scepticism is an 
indication that such scepticism must have been profound. 
The epigonism materialised in the form of an argument that 
Norway was a small country with scarce resources and that it 
could not be a leader in developing new technology. Norway 
ought to wait until the larger nations had developed and 
tested the technology before it procured balloons, airships or 
aircraft. Holm Simonsen argued against such a view in an 
article of 1910: 
many people are sceptical as to the practical value of aviation. 
Such scepticism is only valid when it is used to argue against 
those who are too visionary and see in aviation a revolution 
of society. The scepticism is, however, based on obdurate 
conservatism and ignorance, when it results in statements 
such as that 'the practical value of aviation is too small for the 
small and poor nations to be part of this development' .175 
Debates in Parliament underlined this point. Already in one of 
the first debates on air power in 1909, Bastian Tomas Lauritz 
Eidem (Liberal) claimed that a war in the air would be more 
dangerous for the people in the airships than for the people on 
,,. Widerberg 1901, pp. 186-202. 
175 Holm Simonsen 1910, p. 9, author's translation. 
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the ground. He stated that as far as he knew the best airship 
in the world was a Zeppelin, and that he was informed that 
such an airship had crashed into a pear tree and had been 
destroyed. He also claimed that Norwegian fortress guns 
could quite easily shoot down these ships.!" 
Thus, many argued for epigonism in Norway. The country 
was too small to be a part of the development; it should only 
harvest the seeds when the time and the price were ready. This 
wait-and-see attitude was long lasting within Parliament and 
the Defence Ministry. Those who argued for such an 
approach did not state, however, when the time would be 
right. Their views were in many ways a rather naive 
interpretation of technological development, since it almost 
never stops - or rarely even takes a short pause. 
Centralisation or Decentralisation? 
The first aircraft, which were gifts from private persons or 
institutions, were given to the Army and Navy in 1912. The 
Army got two aircraft, the Navy one. These aircraft initiated 
thoughts on how to organise air power in Norway. Once the 
Army and the Navy had obtained aircraft, both the military 
itself and the Defence Ministry saw the necessity of 
formalising the activity. Traditional military opinion was that 
everything had to find its position somewhere in the existing 
military hierarchy. 
The Defence Ministry'S first attempt to organise military 
aviation came in 1913. It was Parliament that had the 
authority to change the organisation of the military 
establishment in Norway. But, it was the Ministry that formed 
the organisation of military aviation. The Ministry wanted 
two air arms. Although this was not sanctioned by Parliament 
until 1927, this was in practice embodied by 1913. Since 
Parliament refused to accept the proposal on military aerial 
m Stortingsforhandlingerl1909, VIIb, p. 2325. 
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activity put forward by tbe Ministry in 1913, and did not vote 
for anotber solution, the Ministry had to find temporary 
solutions. Thus, Parliament had what can be termed a 
negative power: since it did not sanction any solution at all, 
the power was vested in the Defence Ministry. 
The debate on how best to organise air power contained 
two main doctrinal questions. First was the question of 
whether there should be two air arms or an independent air 
force. From a comparative international view, it is interesting 
that the Defence Ministry as early as 1913 considered the 
establishment of an independent air force. By 1913 no 
independent air force existed in the world, and Norway had a 
total of four aircraft. It is almost impossible to see how such a 
small force could be considered an independent service. 
Second was the question of how to organise the aircraft 
within the two services. Were they to be distributed and put 
under the command of tbe chiefs of the army brigades, or 
were they to be centralised directly under a chief of the air 
arm? These two questions and the viewpoints in the debate 
are tbe main issues in what follows. 
As Prime and Defence Minister, Jens Bratlie, had promised 
during the budget debate in the summer of 1912, the Defence 
Ministry in January 1913 forwarded a proposition tbat dealt 
mainly with military flight. 177 The main theme of the part of 
the proposition that discussed air power was the practical 
arrangements that had to be taken care of in the Army. The 
organisational question was also discussed, but no conclusion 
was reached. One of the reasons for issuing the proposition 
was probably that Parliament had not yet sanctioned tbe 
ongoing development. The Army had established its activity at 
Kjeller, while the Navy had established some activity with 
their only aircraft Start at Karljohansvern. 
In the proposition Parliament was informed that military 
flight in the Army had been established under tbe supervision 
177 Stortingsproposisjon 3111913. 
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of the Inspector General of the Engineering Arm. The 
Inspector, General Rreder, had been given the opportunity to 
give his advice on a more formal solution. Rreder did not 
want, however, to give detailed advice because of the rapid 
development within the field of military aviation. He therefore 
only mentioned possible solutions. 
The Ministry did not comment extensively on Rreder's 
possible solutions. On two occasions the possibility of a 
combined Army and Navy pilot training school was 
mentioned, but not concluded. The rest of the proposition 
dealt with more practical issues regarding the established air 
unit at Kjeller, such as the lease of the field, the procurement 
of a third aircraft and salary for the personnel. 
Proposition 31 from January 1913 was withdrawn the next 
month, because of a change of government. The new Defence 
Minister, Wilhelm Keilhau (Liberal), did not share all the 
views of Jens Bratlie, and the new government withdrew the 
proposition. m Minister Keilhau forwarded proposition 147 in 
June the same year.'" It discussed the question of an 
independent air force or two separate air arms. The Ministry 
had made inquiries about this to the authorities of both the 
Navy and the Army, and also to the four Norwegian military 
pilots. 'SO None of them was of the opinion that an independent 
air force was the best solution. The main reason for this was 
operational. Hydroplanes were to operate together with the 
Navy, and land-based aircraft together with the Army. Both 
for training and operational purposes, it was seen as best if 
each of the existing services established its own air arm. 
The only argument in favour of an independent air force 
was economics. One air force would be cheaper because this 
meant one aircraft factory, one pilot training school, and only 
one administration. 
'" Stortingsmeddelelse 411913. 
'" Stortingsproposisjon 14711913. 
180 Ibid., p. 4-6. 
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The reason for reviewing the idea of an independent air 
force was not based upon the need for independent air 
operations. This is supported by the fact that few of the 
authorities on air power envisaged the possibility of any 
independent operations. The fact that the Ministry concluded 
that the development of the aeroplane as a weapon-carrying 
platform was immature, both in defence and offence, also 
points towards the same conclusion. If military aviation was 
to be used only as a means of observation or reconnaissance it 
was obvious that it should be seen as a support element of the 
Army or Navy. 
Several instances also argued that the already established 
bases - the Army's at Kjeller and the Navy's at Horten - were 
not of a joint nature. Sem-Jacobsen explains in his memoirs 
that they had been looking for a field in the Lillestmm area 
from the early autumn of 1912.181 The two pilots Captain 
Thaulow and First Lieutenant Sejersted, had found the field at 
Kjeller after a bicycle tour of the area in September. The 
Defence Ministry agreed to the hiring of the field, and thus 
Norway's first land-based air base had been established. It 
seems, though, that nobody had thought of a joint air base. 
The use of hydroplanes from Kjeller was problematic, 
although Lake 0yeren was a possibility. When Dons returned 
with his aircraft in May 1912, it was natural for the Navy to 
use Karljohansvern as its base. When Start got floats in 
January 1913, it could use the harbour at Karljohansvern. At 
Horten there was no nearby possibility for a land-based air 
base. Thus, the rapid development in 1912/13 had created a 
practical obstacle to the creation of an independent air force. 
Norwegian air power developed almost by happenstance. 
The Ministry's conclusion in proposition 147 was quite 
clear. Norway was to organise all of its aerial resources in two 
separate air arms. Even the basic pilot training schools should 
ut Sem-Jacobsen and Arnesen 1930, pp. 47-48. 
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be separate. m Some parts of the proposition were used to 
explain why the Ministry had used funding that Parliament 
had not approved to finance some of the activities that were 
going on in both the Navy and the Army. In 1912 Parliament 
had committed the use of some 20.000 NOK to train pilots. 
The Ministry had, however, used some 45.000 NOK, and 
accordingly asked for Parliament's approval of this use of 
unsanctioned money. The majority of the Military Committee 
approved both the spending and the Ministry's conclusion 
that an Army Air Arm was to be established. They did not, 
however, approve the detailed plan of this arm, as they 
concluded that this was premature.!83 
A minority of the Committee did not share these views. 
They believed that Norway had too few aircraft and pilots to 
establish any arm within the Army. This minority consisted of 
the representatives Kragtorp (Liberal) and Svendsbae (Liberal 
minority party). They claimed that such small-scale activity 
did not need a formal organisation. Especially in a period 
when the Army was restructuring (according to the Army Plan 
of 1909), and when finances were not in place for this 
restructuring, new arms within the Army should not be 
established. They were, though, of the opinion that military 
flight should continue within the Army.'" 
The Committee did not debate the question of one air force 
or two air arms. They questioned, however, why the Ministry 
had discussed an independent air force, concluded with two 
air arms, and then put forward a plan for only one - the Air 
Arm of the Army. They awaited a plan for the Navy Air Arm. 
That a plan only for the Air Arm of the Army was 
forwarded was most likely due to the way the Defence 
Ministry was organised. As mentioned in chapter two, 
Norway had established a joint Defence Ministry as early as 
182 Stortingsproposisjon 14711913, p. 8. 
m TiIlreg 9 til Indst S. X.!1913, p. 5. 
, .. Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
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1885. The Defence Ministry continued, however, with 
separate Army and Navy divisions. This led for instance to no 
joint defence budget. Most propositions forwarded to 
Parliament were of a one-service nature. The description of 
the Ministry in the Official Yearbook of the Norwegian State, 
began with a note telling the reader that mail being sent to the 
Ministry had to be addressed either to the Army or Navy 
division. If the mail was of a joint nature, one had to send a 
separate copy to each of the divisions.'" In addition to this, 
the two divisions were led by respectively the Commanding 
General and the Commanding Admiral. 
The proposition on how to organise military aviation was 
written by the Army division, and was therefore not of a joint 
nature. Thus, the problem of cooperation between the two 
services - and indeed the possibility of inter-service rivalry -
was a part of the Ministry's organisational solution. l86 It was 
not until 1917 that the Defence Ministry established a joint 
Military Aerial Commission.187 
The minority's argument was raised in Parliament. It was 
claimed that one did not want to establish a military 
organisation for such small-scale activity, since such 
organisations tended to live their own lives and thereby began 
growing uncontrollably. The Defence Ministry was also 
criticised for the use of unsanctioned funding. These 
arguments seem to have won the day in Parliament. The 
proposal from the majority of the Military Committee did not 
pass (69 against, 50 for), while the minority's proposal was 
carried by a clear margin (96 for, 22 against). Thus, 
Parliament concluded that a plan for the development and 
organisation of the air resources in the Army was premature. 
But it also concluded that the ongoing training and flying 
'" Leganger 1915, pp. 78-82. 
186 It could be that the two divisions were physically separated as well, and if 
that were the case, that would probably hinder cooperation to a great 
extent. The answer to this question has, however, been difficult to find. 
'" Henriksen 1994, pp. 167-168. 
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should continue both in the Army and in the Navy, and some 
funding was allocated. The question of one air force or two 
air arms was not debated in Parliament. '"" 
Once the question of an independent air force or two air 
arms had been concluded, the question on how to organise 
these air arms was raised. During the spring of 1912 Einar 
Olaf Sem-Jacobsen wrote several articles on air power issues, 
and all of them included arguments on organisation. Sem-
Jacobsen, who at this point knew that the arrival of aircraft 
was imminent in the armed forces, wanted two air arms. Sem-
Jacobsen was an Army officer, and his more detailed views on 
organisation therefore dealt with that service alone. He meant 
that a detailed plan was premature, but made some 
recommendations. He was fascinated by and detailed the 
French solution. This meant that all aerial means and 
personnel were to be organised in the Engineering Branch, but 
in a rather independent position. 
In proposition 31 from 1913, General Rreder was willing to 
give some advice on how military flight was to find its place in 
the Army. As a temporary solution he recommended that it 
should be organised as a part of the Engineering Arm, but he 
foresaw a development that would lead towards an air arm of 
the Army. This was, according to Rreder, only to be a 
peacetime solution. In wartime each of the six combined 
brigades of the Army was to have its own flying unit.'"' 
When during the spring of 1913 the Defence Ministry 
worked on proposition 147, it made inquiries of several 
commands in the Army as to their views on the organisation 
of air power. The Commanding General, the General Staff, 
the Inspector General of the Engineering Arm and the four 
Norwegian pilots were asked to give their advice. There was 
"" Stortingsforhandlinger/1913, VIIb, pp. 2651-2667. 
189 Since Norway had a conscripted army, the wartime and peacetime 
solutions had to differ. The mission in peacetime for the commander would 
be to produce operational units for the wartime organisation. 
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an interesting disagreement between the General Staff and the 
Inspector General of the Engineering Arm. The latter repeated 
his views given in proposition 31 some months earlier. He was 
still of the opinion that it was premature to give advice on any 
detailed organisation of an air arm. The General Staff was, 
however, of the opinion that the aircraft were to be placed 
directly under a chief of the air arm, subordinated only to the 
Commanding General (and hence the General Staff) during 
wartime. No aircraft were to be permanently distributed to 
the brigades. The reason for this was that it was in strategic 
not tactical reconnaissance that the aircraft were most useful. 
The Commanding General supported the view of the General 
Staff, but also added that it was the possible theatres of 
operation within Norway that ought to be the guideline when 
the flying units were to be disttibuted throughout the 
country."o The central command in case of war in Norway 
would be the General Staff, wherever that war was to be 
fought. That central element should therefore have control 
over the resources for strategic reconnaissance and 
observation. 
The Defence Ministry concluded by laying out a rather 
detailed plan for an Atmy Air Arm, with its own chief who 
was to be placed directly underneath the Commanding 
General both in peacetime and wartime. The air arm was to 
be organised in two flying groups, one in southern Norway 
and one in central Norway (Tr0ndelag). These fiying groups 
were not to be subordinated to the six combined brigades. 191 
Thus, the Defence Ministry followed the proposals from the 
General Staff and the Commanding General. The aerial 
resources were to be centralised. 
In Parliament this issue was never debated. And, since the 
proposition was not carried by Parliament, the question of 
centralised or decentralised aircraft within the Army was not 
". Stortingsproposisjon 14711913, pp. 14-16. 
'" Ibid., pp. 21-25. 
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concluded. For the peacetime organisation of the Army Air 
Arm, the Defence Ministry concluded that it should be divided 
in two units: "The Tactical Branch" and "The Technical 
Branch". They were not placed under the same command. 
Henrik Thaulow, who became chief of the Tactical Branch on 
15 August 1913, was subordinated to the Inspector General of 
the Engineering Arm. Sem-Jacobsen, appointed chief of the 
Technical Branch the same day, was subordinated to the 
Director of Ordnance Services."2 This organisation was 
probably based on the German ideal that operational activity 
should be split from logistics and research.!93 
One might expect that a debate on how to organise military 
aerial activities would reveal views on air power doctrine. 
This is, however, only partially true for the Norwegian case. 
Although the Defence Ministry actually considered an 
independent air force alongside the Army and the Navy, this 
did not reflect a belief in independent air operations. The 
reason was purely economic - one air force would be cheaper 
than two. Both the military and aerial authorities argued that 
the economic potential of a cheaper air force was not enough 
to establish a third service. The reason for having two air 
arms instead of an independent air force was mainly due to 
the claimed difference in operational demands. Since the role 
of the aircraft was mainly reconnaissance and observation, it 
was natural that they were established in two separate air 
arms. Since there were to be no independent aerial missions, 
there was no need for an independent air force. 
Conclusion 
The role of air power was seen in this period in three different 
ways. Observation was considered the most important role. 
This was of course due to the inherent elevation of aircraft, 
airships and balloons, which made observers capable of 
'" Meyer 1973, p. 27. 
193 Driver 1997, p. 193. 
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viewing a larger part of the battlefield than the traditional 
observer on horseback. In naval operations air power were 
also seen mainly as better platforms for observation than the 
lookouts on ships. This followed the international pattern. As 
John H Buckley states: "The military establishments up to 
1914 saw only limited roles for aircraft in war - essentially 
reconnaissance and artillery spotting. ,,194 Secondly air power 
was seen as a potential offensive weapon. But, none of the 
participants in the debate made this the foremost role of air 
power. Thirdly the new air weapon was considered a 
necessary defensive weapon. The defensive aspect of air power 
had a particular impact on the Norwegian debate. The 
defensive aspect of air power was introduced quite early, 
through the Minister of Defence, Haakon Ditlef Lowzow, in 
1909.195 What he did not say anything about, however, was 
what should be defended. Thus it is unclear whether Lowzow 
foresaw any bombing from the air on civilians, or whether he 
was speaking about the defence of an army or a navy. 
Relatively young but ambitious officers with a technological 
focus wrote on air power in the period. They were without 
exception not established as career officers in the Norwegian 
Army or Navy. The early pioneers of Norwegian aviation 
would suffer the same fate as the British ones. As Malcolm 
Cooper has argued: "Many of Britain's early airmen were 
possessed of strong, not to say headstrong personalities. As 
perhaps befits their positions as pioneers, they did not work 
easily within the established service hierarchy. ,,196 This 
quotation can be directly transferred to the Norwegian 
situation. This created a situation where the pioneers were not 
that influential. Conservative organisations do not make a 
habit of listening to people with unconventional views. The 
,,. Buckley 1999, p. 40. 
'" Stortingsforhandlingerl1909, VIIb, pp. 2322-2326. 
l.96 Cooper 1986, p. 21. 
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pioneers were quite clearly influenced by developments in 
Germany and France. 
The Defence Ministry and Parliament several times stressed 
the importance of air power. These expressions of importance 
led to few practical efforts to develop Norwegian air power. 
The Ministry and Parliament did not sanction such a 
development for two reasons. Most important was the 
everlasting question of funding. The period was characterised 
by tight budgets, especially in the years 1908-1911. Neither 
the Ministry nor the Military Committee could find any room 
for new activities in a period when both the Army and Navy 
were reorganising. Secondly the establishment displayed 
epigonism in matters of new technology. In Parliament some 
politicians mocked the idea of Norway becoming an air power 
nation. Although these politicians may have been few, even 
the Military Committee expressed concerns whether 
technological developments had come far enough for Norway 
to begin its air power development. The best explanation of 
the lack of connection between the expressed importance of 
the matter and the lack of practical effort lies in the 
combination of these two hypotheses. There was no room for 
spending money on uncertain new technologies in a period 
when the budgets were tight. 
The few aircraft were organised in two separate air arms. 
The need for independent air operations was, however, soon 
to arise. The perspective was the same as the situation that 
created the Royal Air Force in Great Britain, in the Norwegian 
case the possibility of a German air attack. By the autumn of 
1916 both air arms considered such an attack a possibility, 
and defensive air operations against such an attack was an 
overarching and independent role for the two air arms. 
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Chapter 4 
The First World War 
The First World War changed Norwegian air power doctrine. 
The role of aerial defence became a major task for both air 
arms. The views on how to organise aerial military activity 
also changed, as the Defence Ministry proposed greater 
jointness for the air arms. 
This change followed the international pattern. The role of 
aerial defence had not been considered a main role for aircraft 
by any nation before the war.'" It grew out of the experience 
that one had to fight for mastery of the air, both in offensive 
and defensive terms. The British mostly used fighter aircraft as 
offensive weapons on the western front, hunting down 
German aeroplanes over the German side. They also used 
fighters in a defensive role, against the Zeppelin airships and 
Gotha aircraft that attacked the British Isles throughout the 
war. The Germans mostly used their fighters to defend 
airspace on the front and to protect their observation aircraft. 
Hence, the Norwegian change in doctrine might be 
explained as a product of international developments. This 
chapter will argue, however, that the change in Norwegian 
doctrine came quite quickly as opposed to other areas where 
Norway could learn from the Great War, and that this 
quickness was a direct product of the fear of an aerial attack 
'" Morrow 1976, pp. 1-57. 
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on Norway. It was the possibility of German aerial attacks 
that created the need for aerial defence in Norway. 
The structure of the two air arms also changed during the 
war. The Defence Ministry put forward two different plans 
for the organisation of the air arms, but neither was accepted 
by Parliament. The pattern from 1913 repeated itself. The 
development of the air arms happened at the discretion of the 
Defence Ministry. 
The Norwegian air arms entered the war influenced by 
French aerial development. Their aircraft were mainly of 
French origin and the pilots and engineers had mainly been 
educated in France. At the end of the war, both air arms were 
under heavy British influence. Their most modern aircraft 
were British, a lot of the pilots had visited Britain during the 
war, and thus the main influence came from Britain. 
As the major powers in Europe went to war in August 
1914, Norway and Sweden issued a common statement of 
neutrality, also promising not to attack each other.'" 
Militarily, Norway was quite well prepared, since Parliament 
had followed a defence-friendly movement within the public 
opinion. In 1913, when Gunnar Knudsen (Liberal) again had 
become Prime Minister, he devoted large parts of his first 
announcement to Parliament to defence issues. This was a 
clear sign of a new policy on defence issues, both from the 
Liberals, and from the Prime Minister himself.'" Parliament 
allocated a lot of time to defence issues during its spring 
session in 1914, and in February 1914 it agreed to sanction 
higher budgets and longer service time for the conscripts.'oo 
Although some parts of Labour were advocating pacifism and 
unilateral disarmament, both the Liberals and the 
Conservatives were willing to strengthen the Armed Forces. 
". Fuglum 1978, p. 480. 
199 Nissen 1933, p. 300. 
20" Ibid., p. 308; Fuglum 1978, p. 481. 
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The Norwegian aerial forces, however, were very small. The 
Navy had no operational aircraft, while the Army had four. 
For some time into the war, the situation got even worse. By 
new year 1915 the Army had no operational aircraft, due to 
several accidents."! The main doctrinal emphasis in both air 
arms was on aerial observation. 
At the end of the war the Navy Air Arm could be termed a 
modern air force, equipped with the fighter aircraft Sopwith 
Baby. Its main emphasis was thus on air defence, although 
observation was still considered a major task. The Army had 
not been able to acquire any fighters. However, the effort 
from the Army to do that from the autumn of 1916 and 
throughout the rest of the war shows that its emphasis was 
also on air defence. A clear doctrinal change had taken place. 
This chapter will look in more detail at why and how this 
happened. 
To write about the debate on air power doctrine in Norway 
during the Great War is rather difficult. This is due to the fact 
that Norwegian officers were not allowed to express their 
views freely in journals or to the press during the war. In 
addition, most debates in Parliament about the development 
of the air arms were held in closed and classified sessions, and 
the documents produced were also classified. These were not 
printed in the Parliamentary proceedings, and a lot of the 
sources disappeared during the Second World War, probably 
to Germany. Since there were no open debates this chapter 
will take a different approach from the rest of this study. It 
will be based more upon what actually happened than the 
previous chapter, because this is one of the ways in which it is 
possible to establish the doctrinal emphasis of the two air 
arms. 
lDl Henriksen 1994, p. 101. 
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The Zeppelin Fear 
A debated question regarding the First World War is to what 
extent war threatened Norway. Was it likely that Norway 
would have to give up its neutrality and join one side in the 
war? When reading the Foreign Minister's statements to 
Parliament - held in closed sessions - one learns that the 
concrete threat of war was not what worried Niels Claus Ihlen 
the most.20' What worried him was the constant British 
pressure upon Norway to reduce its exports to Germany, 
along with the question of what such a decrease would mean 
to the German-Norwegian relationship. Ihlen was a pragmatic 
politician; he balanced Norwegian foreign policy throughout 
the war, always with the goal of keeping Norway out of the 
war. The other central issue in Norwegian foreign policy 
during the war was the country's need to import both food 
and coal from Great Britain and the USA. 
Norway's dependence on imports from Great Britain was 
the country's main problem. The British were most willing to 
use this to apply pressure to stop Norwegian exports to 
Germany. Norway did not import important goods from 
Germany. Thus, the only reason for the Norwegian 
government to please the Germans was the fear of war. Trade 
was the overarching issue in Norwegian-British relations, but 
Britain was also the only country in a position directly to 
threaten Norwegian territory. There was much talk in the 
years before the war as to whether a major power, in the case 
of a war, would try to seize a bridgehead in the south-western 
part of Norway, thus being able to control a large part of the 
North Sea.'03 But only Britain was capable of performing such 
202 Riksarkivet, DD, hoks 5543, several statements. The statements were 
long thought missing, but Karl Erik Haug located them in the Norwegian 
national archives. The author wishes to express his regards to Haug for the 
loan of these documents. 
'"' Fuglum 1978, p. 482. The possibility of a huge naval battle in the 
beginning of the war also worried Ihlen, see Riksarkivet, DD, boks 5543, P 
12-A 01114. 
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an operation, as it would probably stop anybody else who 
tried. Norway's drift towards Britain during the war Was not 
based on a fear of war, but on having a good relationship 
with this major supplier of food and other important goods. 
During the Napoleonic Wars, Great Britain had enforced an 
effective blockade of Norway, which led to famine. The 
Norwegians had not forgotten this. The poet Henrik Ibsen 
captured Norwegian problems in his epic poem Terje Vigen, 
first published in 1862. The poem is about a Norwegian sailor 
who rows to Denmark and back to bring food to his wife and 
child, and is stopped by the British Navy. His wife and child 
die in the famine. Norwegian policy was quite clear. 
Adjustment to please the British, but not in such a manner 
that it would lead to war against Germany. 
The drift in neutrality worried many Norwegian politicians. 
They were uncertain of the German reactions to these policies, 
as Norwegian exports to Germany kept decreasing. The fear 
of warlike reprisals from Germany was common, at least in 
three periods, not only among politicians, but also in the 
population. The first incident happened during the late 
summer and autumn of 1916, when the Norwegian 
government issued a resolution restricting the movement of 
foreign submarines in Norwegian waters. The sinking of 
Norwegian merchant vessels had reached new peaks during 
the early autumn that year, and the newspaper Tidens Tegn 
led the campaign that eventually made the government issue a 
submarine resolution on 13 October."4 The resolution was 
interpreted by the Germans to be unfriendly. In an interview 
with the central newspaper, Aftenposten, on 21 October the 
German Under Secretary of State said that Germany could not 
let this happen without reacting. Many believed this to be an 
unspoken threat of military punishment. In Kristiania, the 
demand for insurance against aerial attacks reached new 
,~ Berg 1995, p. 215. 
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peaks.20' After diplomatic contact with the German 
authorities, the text in the resolution was slightly changed in 
January 1917. The second incident came during the spring of 
1917, when Norway was secretly negotiating with Great 
Britain about the possibility of lending the Entente the 
Norwegian merchant fleet. The fleet was at that time the 
fourth largest in the world.206 The third incident occurred in 
early 1918, when the Norwegian, German and Austrian 
governments negotiated a treaty on trade. There was fear of 
the possibility of German attacks in case the negotiations 
broke down.207 
The overriding fear during the war was the threat of a 
German U-boatcampaign against the Norwegian merchant 
fleet in Norwegian waters. The possibility of attacks from 
Zeppelins on the K orwegian capital and/or industty was also 
considered a possible threat. Olav Riste claims in his study on 
Norway's relations with belligerent powers during the war, 
that these fears were exaggerated, since Germany never 
planned to use force against Norway. He even states that 
"serious military measures could with reasonable confidence 
be discounted by Norway from the very beginning" .208 Riste 
claims that the main reason was that the German government 
did not want to push Norway into the hands of the Entente.'" 
Karl Erik Haug has shown that Germany did not plan a 
war against Norway when the fears peaked in Norway during 
the autumn of 1916.210 Haug shows that what some historians 
have interpreted as a crisis that could lead to war with 
Germany, was actually a political conflict. He writes: 
'" Ibid., p. 216; Furre 1972, pp. 78-79. 
206 Only the British, German and American were larger. 
'" Berg 1995, p. 238. 
, .. Ri,te 1965, p. 126. 
20' As Riste demonstrates, a neutral Norway best served both Germany and 
Great Britain, although several British agencies, among them the Admiralty, 
on several occasions considered options that would bring Norway into the 
war, 
n" Haug 1994 I, p. 79. 
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In this perspective, the conflict between Norway and 
Germany in the autumn of 1916 in connection with the 
Norwegian resolution on submarines was not a crisis which 
threatened to end in war, as it was perceived in Norway at the 
. 211 ttme. 
The point is, however, that what shaped Norwegian politics 
was the contemporary understanding. The fear of German 
Zeppelin attacks was definitely real. Both Riste and Haug 
make a point of exactly this in their studies, that Norwegians 
interpreted the crises to be more serious than historical 
sources have since proved them to be."2 As Riste explains: 
Germany's reactions to the submarine decree evidently made 
a deep impression in Norway at tbe time. There are 
indications that business circles began preparing for a war; 
many owners of houses in tbe capital took out insurance 
against bombardment and war damage; some Norwegian 
diplomats made dispositions for the safety of their families if 
tbe worst should come to the worst.'" 
Thus, as Riste himself shows, even fears that were exaggerated 
were important, because they explain Norwegian policy. One 
of the products of the fear of German attacks was that 
Norwegian air power doctrine changed, as it initiated the 
process of creating an aerial defence for the country. 
A threat assessment, as One would believe Norwegian 
authorities made in the autumn months of 1916, constitutes 
an evaluation of two factors, your potential enemy's intention 
and his capacity. In what follows these two factors will be 
discussed. 
In 1916-17 Norwegian authorities were uncertain as to the 
German intentions. The Norwegian authorities had nO civil or 
military intelligence organisation to support their threat 
111 Haug 1994 I1, 22, author's translation and emphasis. 
m Riste 1965, p. 143; Haug 1994 I, p. 26. 
213 Riste 1965, p. 143. 
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assessment, but the General Staff acted as the central 
intelligence agency of Norway. On 31 October 1916, as the 
problems peaked in the Norwegian-German relationship, the 
General Staff ordered the army divisions to prepare the 
blackout of the cities of Kristiansand, Bergen and Trondheim, 
because, as the General Staff concluded: We are [ ... ] helpless 
. h f' 1 k214 m t e case 0 aena attac . 
In a report on the air force delivered in 1936, Colonel Otto 
Ruge, analysing possible aerial threats against Norway, 
referred to what he termed the Zeppelin-threat of 1916. He 
stated that "We have ourselves a First World War experience 
of how straining threats of such aerial attacks can be.,,215 In 
1916 Ruge was an adjunct of the General Staff, and can 
therefore be considered a valid source as to what were the 
feelings in the General Staff. 
Central Norwegian politicians feared war with Germany in 
the busy days of late October. In the middle of the turmoil 
concerning the submarine resolution, a meeting was held on 
28 October 1916, arranged by the Foreign Minister. All party 
leaders within Parliament participated. No minute of this 
meeting seems to exist, but Johan Castberg has written about 
it in his diaries. 216 Castberg's report was written on 5 
November 1916, only eight days after the meeting, and is 
therefore considered a reliable source. The meeting shows 
clearly that several politicians feared war with Germany, and 
also that the government took some precautions, since 
Defence Minister Holtfodt briefed on the military situation. 
Holtfodt stated, according to Castberg, that, if Germany were 
to attack, it most probably would launch an air attack and a 
U-boat war against Norwegian shipping. He claimed, 
however, that, as long as Sweden stayed neutral, Norway 
214 Riksarkivet, PA 616, pakke 8, 31.10.1916, "Generalstaben til1., 2.,5., 
og 6., div. m.v.", here quoted from Berg 1995, p. 221. 
llS Bilag 2 til Stortingsmeddelelse 3811937, p. 72, author's translation. 
'" Castberg 1953, pp. 109-130. 
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would cope with such an attack. Kristiania and Kristiansand 
could not be attacked by V-boats, and, as long as the British 
were masters of the sea, Germany could not try a bridgehead 
operation on the Norwegian coast. Because of this, Holtfodt 
said that Norway could not tolerate any speculation about the 
British or French being allowed a stronghold on Norwegian 
territory, since this would put Sweden in a very difficult 
position. Johan Ludwig Mowinckel, who headed the Liberals 
in Parliament, did not agree with Holtfodt. Mowinckel stated, 
according to Castberg, that Norway at once ought to find out 
what help the Entente could give if Germany attacked. Foreign 
Minister Ihlen then reported several telegrams from 
Norwegian foreign stations, which stated that both France 
and Great Britain were holding Navy vessels and aircraft 
capable of shooting down airships ready in the event of a 
k 217 German attac . 
Defence Minister Holtfodt worried about the consequences 
for the civilian population in case of aerial attacks upon 
Norwegian cities. Therefore he sent an inquiry to the 
Norwegian embassy in London, asking if they could explain 
what measures the British were taking. Holtfodt was also 
worried about the possibility of gas being used in such 
operations.m Holtfodt got several replies from the attache, 
giving brief information on how the British tried to defend 
themselves.219 
In early 1918, Gunnar Knudsen, on several occasions feared 
that a possible break in the negotiations with Germany and 
Austria would lead to war. In retrospect, Knudsen 
remembered that: 
'" Riksarkivet, VD, boks 510, G14C 3/15, 13.11.1916, Vogt til Ihlen, J. nr. 
33888. 
m Riksarkivet, FD, FD til1940, boks 2, 27.11.1916, FD til VD,J. or 
3616/1916, p. 1. 
'" Riksarkivet, FD, FD til1940, boks 2, 06.12.1916, MiIitrerattacheen til 
FD, J. nr. 1203/1916, p. 5. 
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If there was a break with Germany, we could have risked that 
a few hours later we would be visited by some Zeppelins 
attacking Kristiania, Rjukan and the power stations on the 
river Glommen with the most terrible consequences.220 
What about the perceived German capacity to attack 
Norway? Karl Erik Haug has argued that this was modest. 
Haug has a valid point here. It is correct that the German 
capacity by 1916 was somewhat modest. Peter Fritzsche has 
demonstrated that the Zeppelin attacks on Great Britain from 
1915 until the end of the war were a military catastrophe.221 
The Zeppelins were taking a high loss rate, not proportional 
to the damage they did. But there is clear evidence that this 
was not known in Norway. As in Great Britain, many 
Norwegians exaggerated the capacity of the Zeppelins. In the 
autumn of 1916, probably as a response to the fear of 
Zeppelins, Sem-Jacobsen wrote about the giant airships. The 
article was strictly technical. Sem-Jacobsen did not write 
about the possibility of an attack. He based his knowledge on 
pre-war writings on the Zeppelins, but also on facts given by 
British and French authorities. He emphasised the great 
development that had taken place during the war, and made 
the point that the new Zeppelins had a far better potential for 
creating havoc than earlier models. He even termed the 
Zeppelins "monsters of the air", and concluded with the claim 
that the oceanic journey (the flight across the Atlantic) would 
soon be unproblematic. 222 
It could be claimed that Sem-Jacobsen had his own agenda 
in exaggerating the capacity of the Zeppelins. When he wrote 
the article, he was leading the Army Air Arm, which in this 
period sought to procure fighter aircraft. It would therefore be 
in his own interest to inflate the capacities of the Zeppelins. 
Sem-Jacobsen may, however, serve as an example of the fact 
220 Fuglum 1989, p. 331, author's translation. 
'" Fritzsche 1992, pp. 43-58. 
222 Sem-Jacobsen 1916, pp. 571-578, author's translation. 
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that the capacity of the Zeppelins was interpreted to be that 
they would be able to attack Norway. 
Karl Erik Haug makes the point that Norway was helped 
by its climate, as the Zeppelins could not withstand high 
winds. Haug uses the crash of the L-20 in May 1916 at Jreren 
on Norway's southwestern coast as an example of this.223 But 
Zeppelins were sighted on several occasions on the southern 
and southwestern coast of Norway. They were spotted off the 
Norwegian coast at least four times in July and August 1916. 
In 1917 the Navy registered five sightings of airships.'" 
Although there is some uncertainty regarding the purpose, or 
possible lack of purpose, of the Zeppelin's visits to the 
Norwegian coast, the L-20 was not representative of the 
airships that were seen. Roald Berg has turned Haug's 
argument upside down, by claiming that the L-20 was a signal 
that the next time such an airship could attack Norwegian 
nitrate factories.225 Haug also makes the point that the 
Germans lacked aerial maps of Norway during the war, but 
this was not known in Norway. 
In April 1917 Parliament was again concerned about the 
possibility of a German aerial attack. Johan Castberg wrote in 
his diaries that Defence Minister Holtfodt on several 
occasions was asked whether the Norwegian military was 
prepared for an attack. According to Castberg, particular 
emphasis was put on aerial defence. But Holtfodt was silent, 
and in spite of several appeals in Parliament, he would not 
answer the question, since that would turn the debate into a 
question of defence policy. Castberg himself then replied that 
what Parliament needed was a clear statement that Norway 
was prepared to defend itself. Holtfodt was silent, and, 
m Haug 1994 I, p. 91. 
224 Adrniralstaben, Marinen. NflJitralitetsvernet 1914-1918, samt 
n"itraJitetsvernets avvikling 1918-1919, (Kristiania, 1921), pp. 18-34. 
n, Berg 1995, p. 227. 
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according to Castberg, this was a silence that spoke for 
. If "6 ltse . 
An interesting question about the fear of war with Germany 
is how it came into being. That Germany was thought to have 
the capacity to attack Norway with airships is already 
established. Germany never explicitly threatened to attack 
Norway, and it is possible that Norwegians over-estimated 
their own role in Germany's foreign affairs. Robert Jervis has 
argued that this is a tendency in international affairs, and 
described the phenomenon as "Overestimating One's 
Importance as Influence or Target.,,227 
It is also an interesting feature of the fear that the 
Norwegians feared something they knew very little about. 
Malcolm Cooper has argued that the British felt the 
development of military aerial flight as more threatening than 
other countries in Europe, as the British had felt shielded by 
the Royal Navy.'" This argument can also be used with 
respect to the Norwegians. Although many people, especially 
those in close contact with the Norwegian sailors manning the 
merchant fleet, had felt the effects of war, Norway was still a 
peaceful corner of Europe. The main reason for this 
peacefulness was geography. Norway was a European 
outpost, divided from the continent by the Skagerrak, and 
from Great Britain by the North Sea. The creation of the 
aeroplane and the airship threatened the advantages of being 
an outpost. War could be brought to Norway in a matter of 
hours. In addition, nobody had any experience in this new 
kind of warfare. The possible effects of aerial attacks on cities 
or industries could only exist in people's imaginations. 
Zeppelins were giant monsters of the air. Peter Fritzsche has 
argued that not only was the sheer size of the Zeppelins 
frightening and somewhat superhuman, but also that "the 
'" Castberg 1953, p. 194. 
m Jervis 1976, p. 369. 
228 Cooper 1986, p. 2. 
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streamlined zeppelin itself seemed inaccessible, closed, without 
showing even a trace of the crew, added to the sense of the 
unknowable, possibly extraterrestrial power.,,229 
The Norwegian fear during the autumn of 1916 thus has 
clear parallels to the Zeppelin fear in Great Britain in 1909.230 
The ocean and the distance to the battlefield no longer 
protected Norway, and Britain was no longer the only country 
that seemed able effectively to threaten Norway. The 
importance of the British Navy as Norway's implicit 
guarantee was still considered to be huge in Norwegian 
security policy, but it had been somewhat modified by the 
invention of aeronautics. 
The fear of the airship was about the unknown, somewhat 
"otherworldly, all-seeing, all powerful.,,231 But unlike the 
British in 1909, the Norwegians knew that cities and 
industries had been bombarded from the air in the ongoing 
war. In a sequential DanishINorwegian publication about the 
development of the war, a 1915 issue concerned air power. 
They listed fifteen missions for air power, amongst them 
"Attack on the enemy's main cities. ,,232 
But, the Norwegian situation also is a clear parallel to the 
British policy on aerial defence during the First World War. 
Several scholars have shown that the fear of Zeppelin and 
Gotha attacks was out of proportion to the amount of 
damage that these vessels could create. But this fear shaped 
British aerial policy both before and during the war.'" 
Reactions to the German attacks, however modest their 
results, created the first independent air force in the world. As 
MaIcolm Cooper has argued, the creation of the RAF was not 
ill Fritzsche 1992, p. 49. 
"0 For an outline of the Zeppelin·fear of 1909, see Gollin 1989, pp. 49-63. 
2.11 Fritzsche 1992, p. 49. 
m Jenssen-Tusch, Ewald, Lindbrek and Styrmer 1915, pp. 93-94, author's 
translation. 
'" See for instance Gollin 1989, pp. 49-63, 230-260; Powers 1976, pp. 11-
52. 
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a military, but a political necessity. The British government 
had to show its population that it had done something both to 
th d I· . G 234 protect em an to reta late agamst ermany. 
Aerial Defence Becomes a Priority 
By the summer of 1916 Norway had almost no defence 
against aerial attack. The two air arms had no fighter aircraft 
and no ordinary air defence artillery guns. The only defence 
was some observation aircraft equipped with light machine 
guns, and some artillery guns that had been modified through 
• 235 
a new carnage. 
The Norwegian authorities, faced with the threat of 
German aerial attack, began improving their air defences 
during the autumn of 1916. Although the General Staff in 
1915, in a proposal for the further development of the Army 
Air Arm, had mentioned the importance of fighters,236 it was 
not until the concrete fear of German attacks that Norwegian 
air power doctrine changed. The work would be successful, 
although the time it would take to acquire fighter aircraft and 
air defence guns was rather long. This was, of course, because 
the belligerent countries were not eagerly awaiting customers 
for equipment they needed themselves. The Navy and Artillery 
eventually succeeded. The Navy Air Arm obtained several 
Sopwith Babies from Great Britain, while the Artillery 
acquired both mobile and stationary guns from France and 
Great Britain. 
Before looking into these procurements, it is necessary to 
recapitulate the status of the Norwegian air power doctrine by 
the summer of 1916. Given the procurement policy of the two 
'" Cooper 1986, pp. 10, 65. 
23S Early in the war, work had begun on converting some of the field 
artillery's 7,5 cm W1901 Rheinmetal and Hotchkiss machine guns, see 
Asbj0rnsen 1983, pp. 2, 18, 57-58. 
236 The General Staff only mentioned the importance of fighters, but 
proposed to have none, see Riksarkivet, GS, boks 114, 15.11.1915, 
Generalstaben rH Kommanderende General,]. nr. 2232/15. 
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air arms, it will be quite clear that the aerial authorities did 
not consider aerial defence a major priority until the autumn 
of 1916. 
In the Navy, the aircraft factory at Horten had been 
building several types of aircraft from 1915 onwards. All 
these types were of pre-war Farman design, and designed for 
reconnaissance and observation, although they could be 
equipped with machine guns and small bombs."7 At the Army 
aircraft factory at Kjeller Farman-type aircraft were also being 
built.238 As Vera Henriksen has shown, both Sem-Jacobsen 
and Gyth Dehli kept on constructing obsolete aircraft based 
on the Farman design. Since those two were the only aircraft 
engineers in the country at the beginning of the First World 
War, it could not be expected that they could keep pace with 
the rapid development in the rest of Europe.m 
During the summer of 1916, the Navy aircraft factory sent 
about ten inquires to the United States, Britain and Sweden, as 
to the possibility of acquiring a seaplane for reconnaissance 
purposes. The Army also received some reconnaissance 
aircraft from France, the first two arriving at Kjeller by 
August 1916.240 
The change in priorities came during the autumn of 1916. 
In the Army Air Arm, the acting chief, Sem-Jacobsen got the 
task of putting together a policy for the procurement of 
aircraft from abroad. In October a list was ready. Three 
different types of aircraft were listed. Sem-Jacobsen wanted 25 
Farman 40s equipped with machine guns and light bombs 
which could be used against airships, ten Sopwith or Nieuport 
fighters for aerial defence against high-manoeuvrable targets, 
and 20 flying boats which should be used at the fortresses, 
m For a description on aircraft types built by the Navy, see Hover 1975, pp. 
7-51. 
238 In Norway ten different types of Farmans were built to a total of 45 
aircraft, see Lillevik 1984, p. 30. 
2.l9 Henriksen 1994, p. 104. 
'" Ibid., pp. 71, 105. 
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mostly for reconnaissance.241 The list thus clearly shows a 
change in the priority of the tasks of the aircraft. 
The military attache in London, Major Gulbranson of the 
Army, began the work of acquiring aeroplanes in the 
beginning of November 1916.242 The first hope was to buy 
modern fighter aircraft from the British, but the only plane the 
British were willing to sell was the BE2e, a two-seat 
reconnaissance aircraft. The BE2e was only a modest 
improvement on the BE2c, the famous Fokker-fodder aircraft 
that had been produced in great numbers, which was obsolete 
by at least the middle of 1916.243 The aircraft were thus of a 
quite different type than the ones Sem-Jacobsen wanted. But 
the embassy in London was told on 9 December 1916 to 
order 20 of these aircraft. Not until the middle of June 1917 
did the Air Arm get the promise of 20 aircraft used and of 
different types. The Army pilots already in England 
recommended the aircraft, as the best available option. One of 
the pilots, Tellefsen, later claimed that they had tried to get 
either Sopwith or Bristol fighters, but without any luck.244 
Sem-Jacobsen himself went to England to inspect the 
aeroplanes in July 1917. As he probably knew that the Navy 
was getting new fighters from the Admiralty, he was furious. 
The BE2e did not satisfy the Air Arm's need. He protested 
loudly, worsening his already bad relationship with Colonel 
Griiner and making the military attache in London, Major 
Gulbranson, write a rather angry letter to his superiors.245 The 
British had by then pulled back most of its BE2s from 
frontline service, although the type had proven useful in aerial 
'" Ibid., 108-109. 
'" Riksarkivet, DD, boks 510, G14C 3/15, 08.11.1916, FD til UD,]. nr. 
33284. 
w Cooper 1986, p. 34. 
'M Henriksen 1994, pp. 122-123. 
'" Riksarkivet, DD, boks 510, G14C 3/15, 07.08.1917, Militrerattacheen til 
Forsvarsdepartementet, J. nr. 26354. 
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defence against airships over Britain.'" This possibly should 
have made Sem-Jacobsen less furious about the purchase. It is 
not unlikely that it was envy of the Navy Air Arm, which out 
of the blue had become a modern air force that was most 
difficult to tolerate for him. 
The Norwegian navy attache in London suddenly got the 
offer to buy modern Sopwith Babies from the British 
Admiralty in July 1917.24' The purchase was hastily arranged, 
as ambassador Benjamin Vogt in London stated that "Since 
the situation here changes almost on a daily basis, I 
recommend immediate decision."'" By late July 1917 the 
Navy Air Arm had received their first four Sopwith Babies. Six 
more aircraft arrived in April and August 1918. The First Sea 
Lord, Commodore Pain, had met with Riiser-Larsen and 
Horgen, two Norwegian navy pilots, and, according to Vera 
Henriksen, had almost by-passed his superiors, and ordered 
ten Sopwith Babies for Norway. Pain said that they could be 
more useful there than in Britain. 249 The planes were modern 
fighters; they were equipped with one or two Lewis machine 
guns that fired through the propeller, and could carry nine 
small bombs (9 kilos) or one larger 50-kilo bomb. 
Vera Henriksen wonders what the British got in return for 
both their most modern fighters and also giving Norwegian 
pilots training during the war. Could it be that these aircraft 
were considered a "long arm" of the Royal Naval Air Service, 
fighting German V-boats on Norwegian territory? It is quite 
clear that what the Norwegians wanted was fighter 
aeroplanes, but could it be that the British had other plans as 
to the possible tasks of the Babies? 
'" Lillevik 1984, p. 31. 
247 Riksarkivet, Utenrikssrasjoner, boks 389, 01.06.1917, Marineattacheen 
til FD; RA, DD, boks 510, G14C 3/15, 18.07.1917, Vogt til Ihlen, J. nr. 
24338. 
, .. Riksarkivet, DD, boks 510, G14C 3/15, 22.07.1917, Vogt til !blen, J. nr. 
24438. 
249 Henriksen 1994, p. 72. 
90 FORSVARSSTUDIER 5/2004 
The Norwegian Navy had not been able to hinder totally 
the traffic of submerged German U-boats through Norwegian 
waters. And the Navy stationed their newly acquired aircraft 
not only in Kristiansand, on Norway's southernmost coast, 
but also near Karmsundet, a small narrow waterway inside 
Norwegian territory often used by German U-boats."o The 
official explanation for this new air base was to search for 
mines, but according to its chief, Hjalmar Riiser-Larsen the 
main emphasis lay on chasing U-boats.251 
What the Norwegian Navy wanted were fighter aircraft 
that in addition could hunt U-boats. But, the Sopwith Baby 
was not the best aircraft to do that job by July 1917. It 
therefore seems unlikely that the sole argument behind the 
British decision to sell the Sopwiths to Norway was that it 
wanted the Norwegian Navy to chase U-boats. If that had 
been the case, they probably would have offered aircraft of 
other types. 
With regards to the air defence artillery, the authorities 
were of the opinion that the converted field artillery guns were 
not satisfactory. In the autumn of 1916 Captain Richard 
Osmundsen was sent to both Britain and France to try to 
procure guns. He succeeded in procuring quite modern guns. 
The Army got British guns of 7,6 cm, both mobile and 
stationary types, and the French 7,6 cm stationary gun. In 
1916 the Navy had also bought anti-aircraft guns from 
Sweden to be installed on their small dreadnoughts.252 
The use of the guns, and the possible targets they were to 
protect, gives insight into what the military authorities feared 
most regarding aerial attack. Norsk Hydro's factories at 
"" Meyer 1973, p. 47. 
251 Riiser-Larsen 1958, p. 73. 
252 His travel bill created some difficulties. He had hosted several receptions 
and parties, and the bill reached 60 000 NOK. None of the bureaucrats in 
the Defence !v1inistry dared to sign it, and it went all the way up to Defence 
Minister Holtfodt, who signed it when he saw what Osmundsen had 
achieved, see Asbj"rnsen 1983, pp. 18,24-37,41,259-260. 
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Rjukan and Notodden, which were both owned by French 
investors, were equipped with privately financed British and 
French guns in the autumn of 1916.'" The factories were 
intertwined in the war economy, since they produced nitre for 
French munitions.'S4 The personnel at the factories manned the 
guns, although officers from the Army made up a small corps 
of leading men. Thus, the military did not need to situate its 
new guns to protect the central factories in southern Norway. 
The 12 mobile guns, which had been acquired from Great 
Britain, were put into the defence of the capital, Kristiania. 
The stationary guns were to protect the fortresses in 
southeastern and southern Norway.'" 
The Attempts for Greater Jointness 
When in the spring of 1916 the Military Committee treated 
the Defence Ministry's budget proposal for the Army, it stated 
that "The Committee will, regarding the Air Arm in general, 
note that one has the impression that the development of this 
new and important weapon leaves a lot to be desired. "", 
The Committee concluded, however, that it knew that the 
Ministry was finally about to propose an organisational plan 
for both air arms, and that it therefore did not want to use 
this opportunity to comment more on the matter.'" In April 
1916, the Ministry forwarded the awaited proposition.'" 
Proposition 84 was classified, and was characterised by a lot 
of proposals, but few arguments. 
The Defence Ministry found the situation in the two air 
arms unsatisfactory. It proposed to employ a joint Inspector 
General of both air arms, which clearly shows that it was 
dissatisfied with the cooperation between them. The Ministry 
253 Furre 1972, p. 79. 
'" Bu111978, p. 26. 
'" Asbj0rnsen 1983, p. 90. 
2.i6 Indst S. X.!1916, p. 10, author's translation. 
257 Ibid" p. 10. 
258 Stortingsproposisjon 8411916. 
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pointed towards Britain to explain that it was necessary for 
the development of the two air arms that this became the 
responsibility of a single officer.'" 
Both Fredrik Meyer and Bjam Magne Smedsrud have 
claimed that the Defence Ministry through proposition 84 
proposed an independent air force.260 This is not correct. What 
the Ministry wanted was a common Inspector General for the 
two air arms. The Inspector was not to have operational 
command over any aircraft, but was supposed to become 
responsible for procurement, education and maintenance in 
both arms, as well as being the Ministry's foremost advisor on 
aerial policy. Although the Ministry did not mention to whom 
this Inspector General of the Air Arms was subordinate, it was 
most probably their intention to establish the Inspectorate as a 
part of the Army. An officer of either the Army or the Navy 
could man the position of Inspector. 
The aircraft were to be organised in small groups, 
consisting of one to four aircraft, which were to be organised 
within the six divisions of the Army, or the six different Navy 
districts. Thus, aerial development would be put under a 
centralised leadership in peacetime, while the aircraft was to 
be distributed throughout the armed forces for operational 
use. 
The Ministry wrote nothing in particular about the role of 
the aircraft. Each aeroplane was, however, to have both a 
pilot and an observer, pointing to the conclusion that the 
Ministry still saw aerial observation and reconnaissance as the 
main role for air power. They mentioned the need to educate 
aerial gunners and bombers, but concluded that Norway 
ought to obtain more experience in these matters before it was 
possible to conclude how many men were needed for these 
261 purposes. 
259 Ibid., p. 54. 
". Meyer 1973, p. 25; Smedsrud 1998, p. 24. 
'" Stortingsproposisjon 8411916, pp. 56-57. 
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The proposal from the Defence Ministry had been discussed 
in the permanent Commission on Defence Matters. The 
Commanding General and the Chief of the General Staff 
agreed to the entire proposition, while the Commanding 
Admiral and the Chief of the Admiral Staff did not want a 
common Inspector General of the two air arms. This was 
probably because the Inspector General was to be subordinate 
to the Commanding General, thus becoming a part of the 
Army and not directly influenced by the Navy. The Navy 
feared that naval air would lose priority. 
Another argument has, however, to be mentioned. The 
Navy was, to a greater extent than the Army, involved in 
neutrality guard operations. In this respect, the small Navy Air 
Arm had proven itself a good asset. The Norwegian Army 
was, on the other hand, a war-fighting organisation, with only 
a small part performing neutrality guard operations. Thus, the 
Navy's arguments for a Navy Air Arm probably referred to 
the military as a neutrality guard force. The Army was 
structured for war, and thought of air power in that respect. 
It has not been possible to find out in detail what the 
Military Committee and Parliament felt about the proposition. 
In his report of 1936, Colonel Qtto Ruge gave short 
explanations to documents that are now missing.'" He there 
stated that the Military Committee, in its secret 
recommendations to Parliament, proposed to postpone the 
matter. Parliament followed this advice.263 
The Defence Ministry kept on pushing for a joint leadership 
of the air arms. In a letter to the Military Committee in 
November 1916, it repeated the necessity of joint leadership, 
and referred to letters from both the Commanding General 
and the General Staff who were of the same opinion. The 
Military Committee answered the Defence Ministry in a letter 
of 9 December. Although the Committee was to some degree 
'" Bilag 2 til Stortingsmeddelelse 38/1937, p. 57. 
'" Meyer 1973, p. 43. 
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split on this question, it did not want to go against the advice 
of the Ministry. 264 Both authorities thus wanted a common 
leadership. 
This was, however, not to be the case. The Defence 
Ministry answered the Military Committee in January 1917. 
The situation had now changed. The Ministry stated that it 
saw no possibility of solving the personnel issues regarding a 
joint leadership, and that therefore, as a temporary solution, it 
wanted to establish positions as inspectors of the two air 
arms.265 It has not been possible to find out why the Ministry 
changed its policy so soon, or what were the personnel 
questions that were insoluble. It could be that the Defence 
Ministry did not find the individual who would have trust 
within both air arms. The Military Committee followed the 
reasoning of the Ministry, and the temporary positions as 
inspectors of the air arms were established. It is paradoxical 
that personnel question was able to hinder organisational 
development. 
Since Henrik Thaulow's death in March 1916, Sem-
Jacobsen had more or less headed the Army Air Arm. 
Through a resolution of 18 August 1916 the Defence Ministry 
had made this arrangement official policy. Based on 
proposition 84, the Defence Ministry established the position 
of Weapons Inspector of the Army Air Arm and Air Defence, 
and appointed Colonel Gustaf Griiner to the position from 12 
February 1917.266 Thus, the heavy anti-aircraft artillery was 
organised within the air arm.26' Commander Jack von der 
'" Bilag 2 tit Stortingsmeddelelse 38/1937, p. 57. 
265 Ibid" p. 57. 
266 Meyer 1973, p. 41; Henriksen 1994, p. 110. 
267 This arrangement only lasted about 18 months, since a Royal Decree of 6 
September 1918 decided that the Air Defence Artillery was to be transferred 
to the Field Artillery (mobile guns) and the Fortress Artillery (stationary 
guns), see Asbj0rnsen 1983, p. 91; Henriksen 1994, pp. 129-130. 
NORWEGIAN AIR POWER 1900-1923 95 
Lippe was temporarily appointed Chief of the Navy Air Arm 
on 13 September 1916.'68 
Griiner was a man of great energy who instantly set about 
improving the situation in the Air Arm. He is described as an 
energetic person with loads of enthusiasm. Vera Henriksen 
writes that it was typical of him that he obtained his pilot's 
certificate in 1918, at the age of 53.'" Griiner and Sem-
Jacobsen almost instantly clashed. Griiner entered the scene 
without any experience of aviation, a field dominated by Sem-
Jacobsen. Griiner demanded, for instance, strict calculations 
about the production rate at the aircraft factory at Kjeller, 
while Sem-Jacobsen was always optimistic. A lot of letters 
back and forth show that the relationship between the two 
central men in the Army Air Arm was an unhappy one that to 
d d 270 some egree prevente progress. 
The Defence Ministry took a step towards integration in 
February 1917, when it established the Permanent 
Commission on Aviation. The mission of this Commission 
was to enhance the cooperation between the two air arms. 
Colonel Griiner headed the Commission, and Commander 
d L· d 271 von er Ippe was eputy. 
In 1917, a massive increase in the funding of both air arms 
was sanctioned by Parliament. Through proposition 102, the 
Defence Ministry proposed giant leaps in the budgets of 
military aerial activity in Norway. The money was mostly to 
be used for procurement of new aircraft, as well as for the 
construction of several new air stations, especially on 
Norway's southern and southwestern coast. Some funding 
was intended for the procurement of 21 anti-air artillery guns. 
The guns were to be used to protect the Army in the field, the 
fortresses, the cities of Kristiania and Trondheim, and the 
". Ibid., p. 107. 
'" Ibid., p. 121. 
,," Ibid., p. 132. 
'" Meyer 1973, p. 54-55. 
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factories of the Army.272 As with most propositions during the 
war, 102 from 1917 included very few arguments. The 
Ministry stated again, however, that the new weapon of air 
power was developing so rapidly that it was difficult to 
conclude what the best solution would be. The Military 
Committee forwarded and Parliament sanctioned the 
proposals of the Ministry.'" 
In June 1918 the Defence Ministry again tried to convince 
Parliament to sanction a plan for the two air arms, through 
proposition 165.'" The Ministry's major goal was to make 
sure that the country's military aerial resources were spread 
throughout the country, and not centralised around the 
capital. Colonel Griiner warned against the rapid change of 
the organisation. He claimed that the threats of war and the 
unusual situation in which the air arm was developing should 
lead to only small changes. More fundamental changes would 
lead to a temporary downturn in the organisation's efficiency, 
d h " hh h' 275 a ownturn t at was not wise ill suc ars times. 
Therefore, his suggestions were almost similar to the proposed 
plan in proposition 84."6 The Commanding General and the 
General Staff agreed with Colonel Griiner, and thus the 
Defence Ministry concluded that a plan for the Army Air Arm 
was still premature. The Ministry wanted more experience 
before concluding on this matter, but proposed to Parliament 
to allow the Ministry to follow Colonel Griiner's plan.277 One 
wonders when the Ministry would have been ready to decide 
on the organisation of Norway's aerial forces. 
When discussing the establishment of air bases throughout 
the country, the Ministry stressed that the bases at 
m Stortingsproposisjon 10211917, p. 10. 
m Indst. S. LXXII.!1917; Printout of "Stortingets forhandlingsprotokoll 
1917",p.70. 
274 Stortingsproposisjon 16511918. 
275 Ibid., p. 2. 
'" Henriksen 1994, p. 124. 
277 Stortingsproposisjon 16511918, p. 3. 
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Kristiansand in southern Norway (two bases) and Bergen in 
western Norway be made operational as soon as possible, due 
to what they termed "the current situation". Thereafter, the 
base in northern Norway was to be given priority. Again the 
priority for defensive action against aerial attack was shown. 
The proposition did not contain much on the Navy Air 
Arm. The Navy's air bases at Kristiansand and Bergen were 
mentioned, as was the expected arrival of six new fighters 
from Britain. The Ministry used the proposition to inform 
Parliament that these aircraft would be stationed in 
Kristiansand, another clear sign of priorities. Indeed this was 
where, on Norway's southernmost tip, all fighter aircraft 
within the country were to be stationed. 
British Influence 
When working on proposition 84 of 1916, the Ministry had 
tried to get information about developments from other 
countries. But it complained that this had not proven possible 
because of the secrecy with which such questions were 
treated.'" However, the attempt shows the government's 
determination to follow international developments in air 
power. 
Norway educated its flight engineers abroad in this period. 
Before the war they had been sent to France, but this of course 
created trouble after the war began. Therefore the authorities 
arranged for First Lieutenant Arne K"dtzow to attend an 
engineering school in Lausanne. K0!tZOW'S knowledge of how 
things could be different abroad had a rather peculiar effect. 
On his return to Norway, he wrote to the Defence Ministry 
on 5 December 1916, asking to leave the air arm immediately. 
The reason was that he could no longer tolerate working in 
such a mediocre organisation. His conscience said that he 
could not be indirectly responsible for the development of the 
27S Stortingsproposisjon 84/1916, p. 54. 
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Army Air Arm. K01tzow was an employee at the Army 
Aircraft Factory at Kjeller, which was headed by Sem-
J acobsen. Amongst others, K01tzow criticised the Air Arm for 
not emphasising the tactical lessons from the ongoing war and 
for the lack of air defence artillery to defend the air base at 
Kjeller. Sem-Jacobsen was given the opportunity to answer the 
criticisms. He pointed to the lack of funding and employees, 
and stated that the Defence Ministry had tried to get, but not 
obtained, approval from any of the warring nations to send 
officers to study their air arms. The belligerent countries were 
of course not willing to share their war secrets with a neutral 
country.'" 
This changed, however, as the procurement of British 
aircraft began. From 1916 onwards most Norwegian pilots 
visited Great Britain. The British insisted that pilot training on 
new aircraft types was a necessity, and thus this was the most 
common reason for officers visiting Great Britain."o But some 
pilots were also sent during the autumn of 1916 to try to 
negotiate a purchase of aircraft. The Norwegian Army also 
sent officers to study the development of aircraft at British 
factories.'" The number of personnel leaving for Great Britain 
was so high that it created problems for the pilot school at 
Kjeller. Tancred rbsen mentions in his autobiography that he 
and the chief of the pilot school were the only pilots left at 
Kjeller, since the rest were in Croydon in England for 
d 'l 282 e ucatlOna purposes. 
Other sources also mention trips to Great Britain for 
educational reasons. Pilots Hjalmar Riiser-Larsen and Emil 
'" Henriksen 1994, p. 114-115. 
"" Riksarkivet, FD, FD til1940, boks 2, 06.12.1916, Militrerattacheen til 
FD, 1. Nr. 120311916,5; RA, VD, boks 510, G14C 3/15, 02.12.1916, Vogt 
til [hlen, J. nr. 37557. 
'"' Riksarkivet, VD, boks 510, G14C 3/15, 02.12.1916, Vogt til !hlen, 1. nr. 
37557; RA, FD, FD til1940, boks 2,06.12.1916, Militrerattacheen til FD, 
J. nr. 120311916,5. 
'" [bsen 1976, p. 43. 
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Andreas Horgen of the Navy were in Britain during the 
summer of 1917 to perform pilot training, study aerial 
development in general, and seaplanes especially.2B3 They were 
used as authorities by the Norwegian embassy in London 
when the sudden offer of Sopwith Babies came.284 By June 
1917, Captain Trygve Klingenberg, First Lieutenant Kristian 
Hellesen and First Lieutenant Arne Tellefsen were in Great 
Britain, for educational purposes.'" In March and April 1918, 
Lieutenant Commander Halfdan Gyth Dehli and First 
Lieutenant Leif Ragnar Dietrichson from the Navy were on a 
similar trip."6 There are also indications that British officers 
came to Norway during the war, to train the Norwegians in 
operating their new aircraft, although it has not been possible 
f'd h 287 to III out ow many. 
These visits had a tremendous impact upon the two small 
air arms. In addition, their most modern aircraft, and thus 
their training manuals and technical publications, were 
British. When the war ended, the air arms were under heavy 
British influence. 
The influence can clearly be seen in the proposal from 
colonel Griiner regarding the use of fighters. Griiner wanted 
to fight the aerial battle in an offensive manner. It is not 
unlikely that this was based on the doctrine of the British on 
the western front. The British Royal Flying Corps under 
Trenchard, subordinate to the British Expeditionary Force 
under Haig, was using its fighters in an offensive role at least 
from the Battle of the Somme and throughout the war.'"' The 
Germans had learnt that to fight outnumbered meant to fight 
2S3 Riiser-Larsen 1958, p. 66. 
'"' Riksarkivet, DD, boks 510, G14C 3115,30.07.1917, FD til DD, J. nr. 
25153. 
m Riksatkivet, UD, boks 510, G14C 3115, 30.06.1917, Vogt til Ihlen, J. Dr. 
25573. 
2H~ Henriksen 1994, p. 72. 
'" Riksarkivet, DD, boks 510, G14C 3115, 03.05.1917, Vogt til Ihlen, J. nr. 
14732; Berg 1995, p. 215. 
'"' Cooper 1986, pp. 71-81. 
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defensively. Griiner seems not to have taken into 
consideration the fact that the Norwegian situation was more 
like that of the Germans than that of the British. To fight like 
the British, with very heavy casualties, the Norwegians would 
need numerical superiority, not only in operational aircraft, 
but also in the supply of new aircraft and aircrew. This would 
most likely not be the case. 
Conclusion 
Malcolm Cooper has argued that when the effects of strategic 
bombing in the First World War are evaluated, it is not 
enough to look at the concrete operational results. The 
German attacks on Great Britain and London in particular 
had, for instance, almost no operational effect. But they 
created a fear that produced the world's first independent air 
force.28' 
The same argument can be used about the Norwegian 
situation regarding the effects upon the country's aerial forces. 
The possibility of a German attack that did not materialise 
created a new doctrine and new thoughts on organisation 
within the two Norwegian air arms. 
This change in doctrine and thinking on air power began 
around October 1916. When the Defence Ministry forwarded 
proposition 84 in April 1916, the lengthy document did not 
contain much on aerial defence. The same was the situation 
with regards to the procurement policy of the two air arms. 
By October and in the following months, all this had 
changed. The effort from the Defence Ministry and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to establish an aerial defence of 
the country illustrates this. Another example is of course that 
the Air Defence Artillery was organised as a part of the Army 
Air Arm in February 1917. This can only be seen as an 
attempt to integrate the country's aerial defence resources. 
289 Ibid., p. 65. 
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The establishment of the Permanent Commission on Aviation 
in the same month is also a part of this picture. The role of 
aerial defence was not given to any of the air arms, but was a 
shared responsibility, and it therefore needed cooperation. 
The massive leap in funding to the air arms during the war 
also fits into the same pattern. It was not until aerial attack 
became a most concrete and possible reality, that Norwegian 
authorities began to take interest in the matter. 
The fear of aerial attacks by Zeppelins had produced a 
change in Norwegian air power doctrine. By 1923, however, 
this was almost totally forgotten. 
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Chapter 5 
The Aftermath of War 
When the war ended, and the League of Nations rose out of 
the ashes, the Norwegian authorities quite quickly saw the 
potential for reducing defence spending. Already in the spring 
of 1919, the Government proposed to reduce service time for 
the conscripts. After a harsh debate, this was sanctioned by 
Parliament."o The Government saw the need for a Royal 
Commission that was to evaluate all aspects of Norwegian 
defence policy. The Commission was established by 
Parliament in July 1919.291 The Commission was announced 
16 April 1920. It consisted of 11 civilian members, only its 
secretary being an officer. The Commission was not bound by 
a strict mandate, as even the possibility of total and unilateral 
disarmament was to be considered. 292 The main reason for 
setting up such a Commission was, of course, the social and 
military lessons learnt from the war. But it was also expected 
that the League of Nations would have a great influence on 
Norwegian defence policy. 
The Commission delivered nine reports in the period from 
1921 to 1924. Its report on the air force was delivered on 5 
May 1923, and it argued for an independent air force to be 
established based mainly on the tasks of observation, 
290 Nissen 1933, p. 343. 
29! Stortingsproposisjon 16211919. 
'"' 0rvik 1960, pp. 56-57. 
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reconnaissance and aerial defence. This chapter will argue that 
this conclusion was based primarily on a military argument. 
The Commission wanted a flexible air force to be used where 
it was most needed, and this meant a unified air force. The 
Commission did not propose to expand the air force given the 
harsh economic situation in Norway, and thus used 
economics as its second most important argument. The role of 
independent air operations was not an important argument. 
Before looking in more detail at the Commission's 
recommendations, it is necessary, so as to be able to get a hold 
of its starting point, to give a short status report on the 
Norwegian air arms. 
The situation in the two air arms was unsatisfactory in the 
early 1920s, particularly in the Army. This was illustrated at 
the air show at Kjeller in 1921. Norwegian Aeronautic 
Association arranged the display, and several of the Army 
pilots attended flying BE2e.'" The Swedish pilots beat the 
Norwegians in almost every competition. That it was the 
Norwegian civilian pilots who had been runners-up did not 
make it better. After the show, the newspapers had headlines 
like "Are our aircraft outdated?" and "Do our pilots have bad 
aircraft?", along with more technical criticisms like: "The 
RAF engines that always fail.,,2" The following debate 
criticised the Army Air Arm in almost every aspect. The 
aircraft were not good enough and the equipment was 
outdated. The media wondered what would happen in case of 
war: how long would it take to organise the air arm so that it 
could constitute a fighting force? Colonel Griiner defended his 
organisation. He claimed, for instance, that the outdated BE2e 
machines were among the best the British had, and that their 
stability was very good. The latter statement was of course 
correct: the BE2e was stable, but thus also outdated. As to 
why the newly acquired Bristol fighters were not used, Griiner 
m Thore,en 1953, pp. 99-112. 
2~4 Quoted from Henriksen 1994, p. 155, author's translations. 
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claimed they were not ready because the pilots had not had 
enough training to fly them properly.295 
A striking aspect of the Commission's report is that it 
meant it could use ten years for the development of military 
aviation. It stated that it was not at all satisfied with the 
current situation, but none the less drew up a plan beginning 
in 1925 and not ending until 1936. This plan did not intend 
to significantly expand the air force. If the plan had been 
followed, Norway would only have had 15 more aeroplanes 
than had been suggested in proposition 165 of 1918 (see 
chapter 4). The total number of operational aeroplanes would 
have been 147 by 1936.'" 
Norway did not feel its integrity or sovereignty threatened 
in the same way as before and during the war. The possibility 
of a new war between the major powers of Europe seemed 
remote. The 1920s was a period of disarmament all over 
Europe. Germany was still struggling to heal its wounds after 
the First World War. Russia did not seem to be a threat. As 
Nils 0rvik has argued, in the early 1920s, Great Britain was 
the only country in a position to threaten the security of 
Norway, but British·Norwegian relations were good.2"The 
Liberals (Venstre), which had been behind the build-up of the 
Norwegian aerial forces during the war, changed its 
programme on defence issues in 1921 
Taking into consideration the international peace work, the 
mutual disarmament amongst peoples and national security, 
steps will be taken to reduce our defence forces as much as 
possible, with total disarmament as the final goal. 29S 
m The critique made the Defence Ministry put down a special commission 
to amongst others evaluate the aircraft in both air arms. The comrnision 
gave mostly technical recommendation, and its work is therefore not central 
to this study, see ibid., pp. 151-158. 
~, Bilag 3 tU Innsti/ling VII fra Forsvarskommisjonen av 1920. FlyvevJbnet, 
(Kristiania, 1923), p. 1. 
'" 0rvik 1960, p. 38. 
29S Nissen 1933, p. 361, author's translation. 
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The creation of the League of Nations gave hope for a better 
future in Europe, although the defeated countries were not 
offered membership. The debate about the League of Nations 
in Norway was rather chaotic, although, as Hans Fredrik 
Dahl has stated, the League ought to have suited the idealistic 
Norway very well.'" Several of the arguments used in favour 
of Norway joining the League were of course related to the 
Armed Forces. Major General C.B. Rud, for instance, argued 
in Parliament in 1920 that Norway ought to enter the League 
since Norway would not be able to develop forces to protect 
its neutrality by itself. An expert committee set up by 
Parliament also stated that membership opened up the 
possibility of reducing defence spending. Nils 0rvik states that 
the majority in Parliament shared this view.'oo The debate, 
however chaotic, ended with Norway joining the League.3D! 
To conclude, the beginning of the 1920s was a peaceful 
period in Europe, and thus Norway, not having any 
discernable enemies, did not foresee war. Therefore one could 
plan to use ten years to establish an effective air force. 
In addition, the deteriorating economic situation was 
becoming a huge problem. With governments following the 
leading economic doctrine - to reduce spending in harsh times 
- they fostered this development. In the autumn of 1920, the 
economic recession hit Norway hard. There was huge 
unemployment, a large part of the merchant fleet was laid up, 
and many important export goods dropped in price. 
Unemployment amongst organised workers reached 20 per 
cent, and among those not organised the situation was 
probably worse.''' From our point of view, the key point is 
that the defence budgets kept on decreasing throughout the 
'" Dah12001, p. 33. 
,," 0rvik 1960, pp. 55-56. 
301 For more on the Norwegian debate about the League, see Bee Lindgren 
1993. 
'"' Furre 1972, p. 126. 
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1920s. One of the obvious goals of the Commission was not 
to use too much money. 
The Commission's primary argument was, however, a 
military one, flexibility. A small country like Norway, having 
scarce resources, would have to have an air force that could 
be used where it would be most needed. With a unified air 
force, seaplanes based in Norwegian fjords could attack 
targets on shore, and land-based aircraft could attack targets 
offshore. As the Commission concluded: "For an effective use 
of the country's total aerial resources it therefore seems 
correct and necessary to place the two existing air arms under 
a unified command. ,,'03 
Although the Commission saw the need for some 
specialisation, such as pilots especially trained for operations 
with either of the two existing services, its main aim was an 
air force rid of the barriers stemming from the operational 
environments of the older services. In its report, it repeatedly 
returned to this argument. 
The threat assessment was essential to this argument. A 
hypothetical hostile country would most likely attack Norway 
from the sea, and in that case, the enemy would only be able 
to bring light reconnaissance aircraft. He could not operate 
battle aeroplanes, either fighters or bombers, unless he had a 
stronghold on Norwegian territory and had built an air base. 
But this was not easy, since he probably would bring 
machines that would need a lot of space both to land and to 
take off. The Commission took into consideration the 
possibility of an enemy using his own air bases in his home 
country, but ruled it out due to lack of range. If a foe attacked 
on land, the Commission claimed he would have trouble using 
his reconnaissance aircraft in an efficient manner, due to 
Norwegian topography. The conclusion was therefore that 
massive use of air power, as was seen during the Great War, 
was not so likely in Norway. The Commission warned, 
303 Forsvarskommisjonen av 1920, p. 13, author's translation. 
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though, that technological developments could make this 
reasoning flawed in a matter of years, and that Norway 
therefore had to follow developments quite closely. 
The Commission also used the recurring argument in the 
Norwegian air power debate that the aeroplane was not yet 
fully developed. It would therefore be unwise to invest money 
in huge numbers of aeroplanes today that would be obsolete 
within a few years. The Commission spoke about the 
"stabilisation-question", meaning by that probably a stable 
technological development, and concluded that, when this was 
solved, aeroplanes would have a longer life expectancy. 
In the debate over one or two air forces, other arguments 
used in favour of an independent air force were the smaller 
gap between technology for aeroplanes within respectively the 
Army and Navy; the bad effects of having two organisations 
battling over resources; and the increasing amount of 
independent air operations within all air forces in Europe. The 
only argument against independence that the Commission 
could find, besides the specialisation argument, was that the 
two air arms were already established. This would lead to a 
hea vy and expensive process when two were to become one. 
The Commission argued, though, that if Norway had set 
about the formation of an air force without having any air 
arms, it would most certainly choose an independent service. 
Therefore, one would have to tolerate the troubles that a 
reorganisation would lead to. The Commission argued that an 
independent air force would be required at some point in the 
future, since independent air operations would become more 
important in the future. Although for the time being an air 
force would perform mostly support operations to the Army 
and Navy, this was no argument for not creating an 
independent service. This was because "[t]he few aircraft that 
can be allocated to each region of the country, must, 
108 FORSVARSSTUDIER 5/2004 
depending on the situation, be used both on land and at sea, 
and therefore cooperate with both the Army and the Navy".'04 
The necessity of a joint air attack warning system and the 
problems of dividing responsibility between the two air arms 
for aerial defence, and the cooperation with the air defence 
artillery, also pointed towards an independent service. 
The Commission argued that the air force needed to 
conduct three types of missions. First were the observation 
and reconnaissance missions, both strategic and tactical, 
secondly the fighter missions that were either to protect the 
scout planes or to attack the enemy's scout aircraft, and 
thirdly the aerial defence fighter missions. 
Thus, the Commission wanted to create an air force 
without bombers. Scarce resources made it propose this. 
Modern air operations were divided in three categories based 
on experience from the war: 
• cooperation with the Army 
• cooperation with the Navy 
• independent operations 
The Commission believed in the possible effect of what they 
termed independent operations, what today would be termed 
strategic bombing, and stated that 
By paralysing the enemy's defensive forces, hindering him in 
using his communications and keeping him under constant 
pressure, the air force's independent operations will have a 
. th f 305 great Impact on e outcome 0 war. 
It also claimed that the First World War had shown that 
bombers had to operate in large formations if they were to 
have effect. In addition, bombers were quite expensive. This 
led the Commission to conclude that Norway, given that it 
304 Ibid" p. 13, author's translation. 
305 Ibid" p. 7, author's translation. 
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could not afford enough bombers, should not have any. It 
added, though, that this decision was not to hinder the air 
force's trials and studies of bombing, as long as the resources 
allowed such activity. Bombing was excluded for economic 
d 'I' 306 an not mJ Jtary reasons. 
The Commission saw the fighter as the best means of 
defence. It discussed air defence artillery, but concluded that 
nothing could substitute for the fighter in the battle for 
mastery of the air. The artillery could only make life worse for 
attacking forces, forcing the enemy to fly higher. Only a 
battle-ready fighter force could meet an attacking enemy 
wherever and whenever needed. If this were to happen, one 
would have to organise an air attack warning system. Such 
systems had been developed in all belligerent countries during 
the war, and were of utmost importance in aerial defence, 
since the attacker chose when and where to attack. This led to 
a large and well-planned organisation for warnings of air 
attack within the air force-ta-be. 
The Committee's report was full of ambivalence. In sharp 
contrast to the proposed jointness, it proposed that the air 
defence artillery should not be organised within the air force. 
The main reason was that the Commission did not want to 
create a fourth artillery weapon within the armed forces.307 
First to argue for flexibility and an independent service, and 
then to organise weapons that constituted a part of that 
service's tasks in another part of the armed forces, seems a bit 
odd. The establishment of a joint air attack warning system 
within the air force, and not the air defence artillery, also 
seems a bit odd. Another lack of logic concerned the 
contradiction between the threat evaluation and the air force 
the Commission wanted to create. It claimed that Norwegian 
topography was not well suited to enemy observation and 
'" Ibid., pp. 14-15. 
301 The three artillery weapons that already existed were the Naval Artillery, 
the Fortress Artillery and the Field Artillery. 
110 FORSVARSSTUDIER 5/2004 
reconnaissance missions, but nonetheless proposed to 
establish an air force with exactly that role as its first priority. 
If a pilot of another nation could not see through dense 
forests, neither could a Norwegian pilot. 
The third and most important ambivalent factor in the 
report was the lack of jointness in the detailed proposal on the 
organisation of the new service. Separate squadrons and wings 
for the Navy and Army were to be organised. Only two small 
squadrons of fighters were to be really joint for air defence 
purposes, controlled by the supreme military command. In 
addition, the new air force was not to become a third service 
with respect to personnel, since the 29 flying officers that were 
to form its full-time officer corps would continue as officers 
within the Army or Navy. This was because careers within the 
air force would be short, since few pilots could continue flying 
for very many years. The proposed independent service was 
actually not that independent. 
Epilogue to the Defence Commission 
The Defence Ministry, seeing that one of the arguments used 
by the Commission was that an independent air force would 
become a necessity in the future, put the proposal aside. It fell 
back on its usual wait-and-see approach, but did form a 
special air force committee to look into the question once 
more.'" This Committee did not report until 1926, and then 
took a middle course and proposed better cooperation 
between the two existing air arms. 
In 1926, a government headed by Johan Ludwig 
Mowinckel (Liberal), was the first to propose anything based 
on the Commission's report. Proposition 33 argued that the 
time was not ripe for an independent air force. This was to be 
arranged when joint air operations were a reality.'" The 
308 Riste 1985, p. 3. 
, .. Stortingsproposisjon 33/1926, pp. 158-159. 
NORWEGIAN AIR POWER 1900-1923 111 
Government had listened to the naval authorities, but the 
Commanding General was also against a third service. 
The Mowinckel government had to step down in March 
1926. A govemment headed by Prime Minister Lykke 
(Conservative) took over, and immediately withdrew 
proposition 33.'10 The new government took another 
approach. They discussed the proposals from the Commission 
in a statement to Parliament in 1926, and stated that 
With regards to the air force the Ministry has [ ... ] reached the 
conclusion that both military and economic arguments are in 
favour of a country like ours moving away from the present 
situation with two separate air arms for the Army and Navy. 
The air force will therefore be proposed to become a service 
alongside the Army and the Navy.31I 
The Government referred to international developments to 
underline this argument. More and more countries formed 
independent air forces. Since the Norwegian situation was not 
that different, Norway had to follow the international pattern. 
Olav Riste has missed the fact that the conservative 
government in 1926 signalled an independent air force. He 
has, however, accurately characterised the policy of the 
Defence Ministry thereafter, when he concludes, "Again the 
Ministry of Defence, faced with conflicting advice, took the 
line of least resistance. And this time Parliament took a formal 
decision in favour of the establishment of separate air forces 
for the army and navy.,,312 Faced with several comments based 
on their proposal for an independent air force, the Defence 
Ministry wrote two letters to the Military Committee on 26 
November and 11 December 1926.It repeated that its ideal 
was an independent air force, but, faced with the probable 
trouble of a unification process, concluded that it was 
'" Stortingsmeddelelse 19/1926. 
311 Stortingsmeddelelse 3011926, p. 7, author's translation. 
312 Riste 1985, p. 3. 
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premature to push the decision through.313 Given this advice 
from the Ministry, the Military Committee proposed to 
Parliament finally to sanction the establishment of the two 
existing air arms.'l' This was done by Parliament in February 
1927.315 
Both the Defence Ministry and the Army were clearly of the 
opinion that an independent air force was the best 
organisational form, but they were not confident enough to 
push the decision through. Disagreement within the Armed 
Forces eventually led to no action being taken at all. 
Conclusion 
The period after the First World War created few new 
thoughts about air power. The lessons of the war had mostly 
been learnt during the war years. This made the report of the 
Commission almost uninteresting. It would take three years 
before the Defence Ministry forwarded some of its arguments 
to Parliament, a clear signal of this. 
The conclusions of the report could have been written at 
least six years before. A more unified air service was the goal 
of the Defence Ministry as early as 1916. The arguments were 
almost the same, although the flexibility argument was not 
that distinctive in the 1916 proposal from the Ministry. 
The situation was the same over the priorities about 
different roles for air power. The main task was still to be 
reconnaissance and observation. Protection of ones own and 
attack on the enemy's scouting aircraft were priority number 
two. The lessons from the fear of aerial attack only a few 
years before were almost totally forgotten. Although the 
Commission mentioned this, it stated that geography and 
topography would protect Norway. But the importance of 
distance was deteriorating almost year by year as the range of 
m Bilag 8 til Innst. S. 211927. 
OH Innst. S. 2/1927, pp. 93-94. 
m Stortingsforhandlingerl1927, VIIa, pp. 63-204,208-245. 
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aeroplanes became better. The First World War had shown 
this. The Commission stated that the possibility of aerial 
attacks upon Norway had decreased, and thus also the 
importance of aerial defence. This was in accordance with 
international developments, but in Norway for a different 
reason. As the aeroplane took over the airship's role as the 
offensive weapon, aerial defence was regarded to be almost 
impossible, since one could not defend a country's entire 
airspace. In Norway, however, the change from airships to 
aircraft as the most likely offensive weapon, led the 
Commission to conclude that Norway again would be 
protected by geography. 
The topography of the nation was its second shield, if 
anybody should attack. Aeroplanes were difficult to use in 
Norwegian terrain and climate. It was almost implicit in the 
Commission's argument that only Norwegians could operate 
aircraft with success under such conditions. This line of 
reasoning followed the traditional Norwegian approach: to 
fight well in Norway, you had to be used to the climate and 
topography. Some 17 years later, the Germans were to prove 
them wrong. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
In the period around the dissolution of the union with 
Sweden, some Norwegian officers began to consider the 
consequences of manned flight for military operations. They 
developed ideas on doctrine and organisation, and saw air 
power's most important contribution to warfare as 
observation and reconnaissance. 
These officers set out to convince the Norwegian political 
and military authorities through articles and addresses that 
the development of air power was necessary in Norway. The 
officers were inspired by both German and French 
developments, and followed them quite closely. Several 
officers were educated as aerial engineers and pilots in France. 
Thus, when the First World War began, air power was 
already on the agenda both in the military and political 
establishment. Although the Norwegian air arms were small 
and only temporarily organised, their existence made it 
possible for Norwegian authorities to expand the activity 
when it was necessary. Necessity arrived with the fear of aerial 
attacks from Germany in the late autumn of 1916. This fear 
changed Norwegian air power doctrine. Aerial defence 
became a priority within both air arms, and aircraft to fight 
the hypothetical airships from Germany eventually came from 
Great Britain. 
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When the war ended the air power doctrine returned to its 
pre-war priorities. Observation and reconnaissance were 
regarded as the most important tasks. Aerial defence was not, 
however, totally forgotten. But, the Defence Commission of 
1920 stated that the possibility of aerial attacks upon 
Norwegian soil had decreased, and thus also the importance 
of aerial defence. 
Throughout the period, the officers led developments. At no 
time was the political establishment in the forefront. The 
development of air power was not politicised in Norway. 
The politicians were, however, mainly occupied with the 
organisational question. Although views on organisation 
could also be based on doctrinal ideas, organisation itself 
became more and more important as time went on. For 14 
years the Defence Ministry tried to get a formal decision from 
Parliament with regards to the organisational question, but 
without success. The question was difficult, as it threatened 
the two existing services. This was not a uniquely Norwegian 
problem: it figured in the development of air power in most 
European countries. 
The introduction of air power in Norway met with no 
opposition in principle, with the exception of anti-military 
milieus within Labour. The importance of air power was 
stressed on several occasions in Parliament. This did not lead, 
however, to huge investments or to development within the 
two air arms. As the organisational consequences of this new 
technology were put forward, opposition emerged. Therefore, 
when the theoretical importance of air power technology and 
doctrine approached the realities of organisation, almost 
nothing happened. 
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Norwegian Air Power 1900-1923 
From around 1904 the issue of air power was on the 
Norwegian military and political agenda. This study 
traces the Norwegian air power debate on two themes: 
doctrine and organisation. The birth and childhood of 
Norwegian air power was not unproblematic. The 
main reason was that the theoretical and practical 
importance of air power were disproportionate. Thus, 
when the theoretical importance of air power 
technology and doctrine approached the realities of 
organisation, next to nothing happened. 
Ole jergen Maae 
Lieutenant Colonel Ole j0rgen Maa0 
is acting director of the Department of 
Air Power and Technology at the 
Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy 
in Trondheim. He was educated at the 
Academy and has served within the 
Ground Based Air Defence. Maa0 
holds a Master of Philosophy from 
the University of Glasgow. 
Institutt for forsvarsstudier 
Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies 
Institutt for forsvarsstudier 
Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies 
